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Administrative law is often said to present a dilemma. On one hand, all three 
branches of the federal government have crafted procedures to facilitate public 
participation in the regulatory process and to ensure that the benefits of regulations 
outweigh their costs. But on the other hand, such procedures have a price—they slow 
administrative action and sometimes thwart it altogether. In fact, marching under 
the banner of “ossification,” an entire literature has formed around the idea that 
there are too many procedures and that administrative law should be transformed 
to speed up the regulatory process. 
Ossification, however, has an overlooked, proregulatory benefit: it allows 
agencies to promulgate “sticky regulations”—that is, rules that cannot be changed 
quickly. And sticky regulations can be quite valuable, especially when one recalls 
that agencies seek not only to regulate things as they now exist but also to encourage 
the emergence of a future that does not yet exist. Regulators are often hard pressed 
to achieve long-term policy goals absent private investment in innovation—and 
private investment is enhanced by regulatory stability. Agencies thus can benefit 
from their ability to reassure private parties that the regulatory landscape will not 
be upended before long-term investments can be recouped. Hence the counterintui-
tive upside of ossification: the very fact that regulatory change is hard creates the 
stickiness that helps agencies regulate into the future. This is not to say that ossifi-
cation is always a boon for agencies or that all procedures are cost justified. It is to 
say, however, that once the value of sticky regulations is accounted for, the widely 
held belief that a dilemma exists between robust procedures and agency flexibility 
must be rejected as too simplistic. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Modern administrative law is often said to present a 
dilemma. On one hand, robust public participation in the regula-
tory process is valuable, and agencies should not promulgate 
regulations that cost more than they are worth. And further, at 
least as a conceptual matter (leaving aside for a moment how it 
may work in practice), it is hard to argue against the idea that 
there should be external review of agency decisions—for instance, 
by courts or the White House, or both—to help ensure that agen-
cies make sound decisions. After all, although agency officials no 
doubt try to do their best, like anyone else, they make mistakes.1 
 
 1 See Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U 
Chi L Rev 1, 4 (1995) (noting certain “pathologies of modern regulation”); Mark Seidenfeld, 
A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 Harv L Rev 1511, 1563 
(1992) (faulting those who “naively” assume the best of agencies); Mach Mining, LLC v 
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Such “good government” concerns have prompted the United 
States to impose numerous procedural restrictions on agencies, 
with the cumulative effect being that administrative law is now 
characterized by a great many procedures.2 And although there 
are dissenting voices (for instance, one might believe that courts 
are not institutionally competent to review agency reasoning),3 
these procedures are often thought of as “good,” that is, they gen-
erally make things better rather than worse.4 All else being equal 
then, such procedures should be embraced. 
But on the other hand, not all else is equal—these procedures 
have costs of their own. As Professor Adrian Vermeule explains, 
even if regulatory procedures may encourage “the rationality of 
agency policymaking,” they may also “clog[ ] the pipeline of 
agency policymaking.”5 In other words, administrative proce-
dures carry with them “opportunity costs” as agencies are forced 
to delay regulatory action while officials check off procedural 
boxes.6 When it comes to agency action, however, promptness can 
be a good thing; in fact, delay sometimes can be dangerous.7 
Hence the supposed dilemma: procedures are good because they 
enable public participation and help prevent agency mistakes, but 
they may also unduly hinder agency action, thereby thwarting 
 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 135 S Ct 1645, 1652 (2015) (explaining that 
we “need not doubt” the administrative state’s “trustworthiness, or its fidelity to law, to 
shy away from” a world without checks and balances). 
 2 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 
Colum L Rev 1749, 1755 (2007) (“For as long as agencies have existed, administrative 
procedures (and judicial review) have controlled their decisionmaking.”). 
 3 See Elizabeth Magill and Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power within Agencies, 120 
Yale L J 1032, 1056 (2011) (arguing that judicial review “tends to empower technocrats 
and lawyers at the expense of political appointees within agencies”); Thomas J. Miles and 
Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U Chi L Rev 761, 772 (2008) 
(noting that in light of “the distinctive competence of agencies and courts,” one might con-
clude that “questions of policy and fact should be resolved by agencies”). 
 4 See Bressman, 107 Colum L Rev at 1751–52 (cited in note 2). 
 5 Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 Harv L Rev 1095, 
1144 (2009). 
 6 Id. 
 7 See Matthew T. Wansley, Regulation of Emerging Risks, 69 Vand L Rev 401, 409 
(2016) (“Regardless of whether the rulemaking process has become too demanding in 
general, the notice and comment requirements are crippling when agencies seek to regu-
late emerging risks.”); Michael A. Livermore and Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, 
Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 Georgetown L J 1337, 1354 (2013) (noting the potential 
danger of “underregulation”). 
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another good thing.8 To the extent that good procedures prevent 
agencies from doing good things, we have a dilemma.9 
Premised on this supposed dilemma, a large body of scholar-
ship has grown up around the idea that when it comes to modern 
administrative law, the playing field is too heavily tilted in favor 
of procedure. The label given to this view is “ossification.”10 The 
thrust is that in today’s world, it takes too much time and too 
many resources for agencies to act—particularly for notice-and-
comment rulemaking.11 The agency must prepare a detailed 
notice of proposed rulemaking that sets out the data it intends to 
use.12 It must solicit input from the public and then respond, 
sometimes to thousands of comments.13 The agency may also have 
to engage in cost-benefit analysis, which can be reviewed criti-
cally by the White House’s Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA).14 All of this can take a long time—especially, 
perhaps, if OIRA is concerned about the project.15 And after all of 
that, the agency’s decision must satisfy the “hard look” standard 
of judicial review16—which can be challenging.17 Indeed, because 
of hard-look review, the agency may be forced, de facto, to engage 
in massive pre-promulgation planning to avoid being condemned 
 
 8 Further, regulating agencies is costly, and it would be difficult to eliminate agency 
mistakes in a cost-justified manner. See Adrian Vermeule, Optimal Abuse of Power, 109 
Nw U L Rev 673, 677–78 (2015) (urging the recognition that preventing all abuses of power 
is too costly). 
 9 See Cambridge Academic Content Dictionary 256 (Cambridge 2009) (defining 
“dilemma” as “a situation in which a choice has to be made between possibilities that will 
all have results you do not want”). 
 10 See Charles W. Tyler and E. Donald Elliott, Administrative Severability Clauses, 
124 Yale L J 2286, 2328 n 162 (2015) (collecting literature on ossification). 
 11 See generally Richard J. Pierce Jr, Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to 
Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 Geo Wash L Rev 1493 (2012). 
 12 See Maeve P. Carey, The Federal Rulemaking Process: An Overview *5–6 
(Congressional Research Service, June 17, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/SU5L-T3SG. 
 13 See id. 
 14 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and 
Realities, 126 Harv L Rev 1838, 1842, 1846 (2013); Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential 
Control, Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma, 61 Duke L J 1763, 1793–94 (2012). 
 15 See Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 Mich L Rev 683, 699 
(2016) (noting the claim that “OIRA has thwarted regulatory activity by silently sitting on 
rules, and, in some cases, delaying initiation of the review process”), citing Lisa Heinzerling, 
A Pen, a Phone, and the U.S. Code, 103 Georgetown L J Online 59, 61 (2014). 
 16 See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc v State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co, 463 US 29, 41–44, 46–57 (1983); Merrick B. 
Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 Harv L Rev 505, 526 (1985) (explaining 
the “origins of the hard look doctrine”). 
 17 See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial 
Review, 58 Admin L Rev 753, 764–65 (2006) (explaining why “hard look” can be especially 
labor intensive for agencies). 
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after the fact for not having addressed an “important aspect of the 
problem.”18 Faced with so many steps, some fear that agencies 
may give up and not issue rules at all and instead opt to use (or 
even abuse) tools like guidance documents.19 
Although there are disputes about just how prevalent ossifi-
cation is,20 at the most basic level nearly everyone agrees that the 
procedures that give rise to ossification make it harder for agen-
cies to regulate, at least at the margins. If agencies must satisfy 
more procedural requirements, it should take them longer to act—
that is, unless they opt to divert resources from other projects. 
Either way, the agency’s burden is increased, so one would expect 
less total administrative action, greater delays for the action that 
does get through, or both. The real disagreement then, at least as 
conventionally understood, boils down to a fight over whether 
these procedures are cost justified—that is, is the good that they 
generate weighty enough to offset the good that would come from 
more prompt regulatory action?21 And if not, how should those 
procedures be reformed? At bottom, this supposed dilemma has 
been the launching pad for many important articles.22 
An important premise of this literature, however, has largely 
gone unquestioned: Is this supposed dilemma real? I suggest 
 
 18 State Farm, 463 US at 43. 
 19 See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 
41 Duke L J 1385, 1386 (1992) (arguing that “agencies are beginning to seek out alterna-
tive, less participatory regulatory vehicles”). See also Aaron L. Nielson, Beyond Seminole 
Rock, 105 Georgetown L J 943, 985 (2017) (explaining the dynamic relationship of regula-
tory doctrines). 
 20 See, for example, Jason Webb Yackee and Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossifi-
cation Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950–
1990, 80 Geo Wash L Rev 1414, 1475 (2012) (challenging the view that ossification is 
common); Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique 
of Judicial Review, 70 Ohio St L J 251, 320–21 (2009) (similar); William S. Jordan III, 
Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with 
Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Nw U L 
Rev 393, 439–41 (2000) (similar). 
 21 See Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 NYU L Rev 1, 60 (2015) (noting the 
“debate” over “the existence and extent of ossification” and “the benefits of searching judicial 
review”); Lynn E. Blais and Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive Regulation, 
and the Problem of Rulemaking Ruts, 86 Tex L Rev 1701, 1709 (2008) (“Yet even if ossifi-
cation is occurring . . . there is no general consensus that the costs of ossification outweigh 
the benefits of close and sustained judicial oversight of administrative agencies by the 
federal courts.”); Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A 
Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 Tex L Rev 525, 529–30 (1997) (rejecting a “middle 
ground” that supposedly retains the benefits of hard-look review while reducing ossifica-
tion), citing Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to 
Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 Tex L Rev 483, 485 (1997). 
 22 See Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 67 Admin L Rev 
65, 67–68 (2015) (collecting citations). 
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not—or, at least, that any such dilemma, if it exists, differs 
considerably from what the ossification literature suggests. This 
is so because a “procedures make it hard for agencies to act” 
framework overlooks something important about administrative 
law: procedural restraints may expand an agency’s regulatory 
menu rather than contract it. In other words, agencies sometimes 
may have more choices, not fewer, because they are subject to 
procedural restraints that slow regulatory action. Counterintui-
tively, then, ossification (that is, the idea that it takes a lot of time 
and resources for agencies to satisfy all of their procedural duties) 
may sometimes benefit agencies rather than harm them. This is 
so because ossification can act as a credible commitment mecha-
nism against change. Because regulated parties know that an 
agency must survive a procedural gauntlet to change a regulatory 
scheme, they can have more confidence in that scheme’s stability. 
Under certain circumstances, that stability can encourage more 
activity of the sort that the agency wishes to encourage. 
In short, regulatory scholars have overlooked the value of what 
I call sticky regulations: regulations that cannot be changed or 
rescinded quickly. The reality is that administrative law operates 
across four dimensions, not just three, with the fourth dimension 
being time.23 Agencies not only seek to regulate today’s three-
dimensional world (that is, our physical world of height, width, 
and depth), but they also often act to encourage the emergence of 
a preferred future that does not yet exist.24 Thus, for instance, 
regulators create incentives designed to encourage regulated 
parties to develop technologies that help agencies accomplish 
their long-term goals.25 Agencies, of course, might do the same when 
they create incentives for other types of long-term investments like 
creating workforce retraining programs, locating new facilities in 
economically disadvantaged regions, or opening charter schools. 
Yet such encouragement is not easy—especially after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Communications Commission 
 
 23 See Rebecca R. French, Time in the Law, 72 U Colo L Rev 663, 727 (2001) 
(“Hermann Minkowski[’s] . . . book, Time and Space (1907), was the first to mention the 
‘fourth dimension,’ a reference to time within Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity.”). 
 24 See Jonathan Masur, Judicial Deference and the Credibility of Agency Commit-
ments, 60 Vand L Rev 1021, 1038–45 (2007) (arguing that agencies and their regulatory 
missions benefit from the temporal stability of regulations). 
 25 See, for example, D. Bruce La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental 
Protection Statutes, 62 Iowa L Rev 771, 805–06 (1977) (explaining how agencies direct 
regulated parties to generate new technologies); Sarah Tran, Expediting Innovation, 36 
Harv Envir L Rev 123, 137 (2012) (urging the Patent and Trademark Office to shift 
resources to encourage socially beneficial innovation). 
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v Fox Television Stations, Inc.26 Indeed, it is now black-letter law 
that agency officials in time period one generally cannot bind 
their successors in time period two.27 Agencies, however, often 
require private investment to meet long-term regulatory goals—
investment that sometimes can be recouped only if the regulatory 
scheme does not materially change for years.28 If regulated parties 
are not confident that the scheme will remain unchanged, then 
they will invest less in agency-favored priorities or perhaps leave 
the market altogether.29 
This inability for agencies to inspire long-term confidence can 
make regulating more difficult. Because everyone knows that an 
agency can change its mind, private parties must worry about 
trusting the durability of an agency-created incentive—meaning 
an agency’s ability to direct innovation through incentives is 
lessened. The upshot is that if regulated parties with whom the 
agency has a symbiotic relationship cannot trust the regulator (or 
must put a significant discount factor on that trust), then the 
agency’s ability to regulate into the future is reduced, at least at 
the margins. This lack of trust harms agencies, not just regulated 
parties, because in a world in which regulated parties reasonably 
lack confidence in the stability of the regulatory scheme, agencies 
are less able to pursue policies with longer time horizons. 
To effectively regulate into the future, agencies thus need a 
commitment mechanism30—some way to credibly convince regu-
lated parties that administrative policy will not change too 
quickly. In other words, agencies need sticky regulations. Where 
in administrative law, however, can stickiness be found? The lead-
ing article addressing this question is Professor Jonathan Masur’s 
Judicial Deference and the Credibility of Agency Commitments.31 
Masur focuses on how stare decisis can be used to create stability, 
and from that vantage point, he criticizes the Supreme Court’s 
holding in National Cable & Telecommunications Association v 
Brand X Internet Services32 that agencies are not always bound by 
 
 26 556 US 502 (2009). 
 27 See id at 515 (holding that an agency can change course if “the new policy is per-
missible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes 
it to be better”). 
 28 See Masur, 60 Vand L Rev at 1041–42 (cited in note 24). 
 29 See id. 
 30 See id at 1060. See also Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive 
Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 Harv L Rev 657, 697–704 (2011) (explaining 
constitutional commitment mechanisms). 
 31 See generally Masur, 60 Vand L Rev 1021 (cited in note 24). 
 32 545 US 967 (2005). 
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prior judicial interpretations of the statutes they administer.33 In 
fact, Masur goes so far as to say that “[b]y abolishing the settling 
effect of judicial decisions, the Court has eliminated the only, 
albeit crude, method by which Congress, a regulated party, or 
even an agency itself could have fixed a policy . . . in place.”34 
Masur is right that Brand X reduces an agency’s ability to make 
credible commitments. But he is wrong that Brand X eliminated 
the “only” commitment mechanism in an agency’s toolkit. 
Instead, I show that ossification can act as an agency com-
mitment mechanism, thereby allowing agencies to promulgate 
sticky regulations. The insight is simple: to the extent that 
regulated parties know that regulators cannot quickly change 
regulatory schemes, they can proceed with greater confidence to 
do what an agency in time period one would like them to do. If an 
investment requires a decade of steady returns to be profitable, 
investors need to know that the underlying scheme won’t change 
in four years—for instance, when the next administration begins. 
And how can they know that? The procedures that are blamed for 
ossification. Even if agency officials in the future wish to change 
course in time period two, because of administrative law’s many 
procedures, they cannot immediately do so, which creates the 
stickiness that agencies can use to induce private reliance. This 
is agency empowering. 
The implications of this insight are significant. Once one 
recalls that agencies often have symbiotic relationships with 
those they regulate,35 ossification’s potential upside becomes 
apparent. An agency, for instance, cannot create a world with 
certain types of agency-favored automobiles if no one will build 
them.36 Seen in this light, ossification sometimes may be a boon 
for agencies rather than a burden. The supposed dilemma at the 
heart of modern administrative law, in other words, is of a different 
character than scholarship to date suggests. The true dilemma is 
that agencies can either have long-term trustworthiness or short-
term flexibility, but perhaps not both. If agencies can make rules 
easily (which in a sense benefits agencies), then their ability to 
regulate into the future is necessarily reduced (which in another 
sense harms agencies). Reformers therefore should not ask “what 
 
 33 Masur, 60 Vand L Rev at 1024 (cited in note 24). 
 34 Id (emphasis added). 
 35 See id at 1043. 
 36 See id at 1022 (explaining why “manufacturers rationally may decide to decline 
the offer implicit in [an agency’s] new rule and not invest in the costly (but socially pro-
ductive) new technology, frustrating the agency’s regulatory aims”). 
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can we do to hurry up the process?” but rather “how much 
procedural delay is necessary if we want to properly balance the 
regulatory benefits of long-term stability against the short-term 
costs that those benefits require?” 
Indeed, if agencies could not make credible commitments, 
agency-created incentives would have to be much larger to achieve 
the same result. Basic economics suggests that in evaluating a 
potential investment opportunity, a regulated party considers 
how likely it is that incentives will remain in place. The less 
certainty there is that incentives will remain, the larger those 
incentives must be to offset the risk. Incentives, however, are not 
costless; agencies must either give up money or something else. 
To the extent that regulatory incentives can be sticky, therefore, 
they can also be smaller. 
To be sure, I do not contend that all procedures are cost 
justified. Nor do I argue that every situation needs a sticky 
regulation. Instead, my point is more limited—it is too simplistic 
to condemn ossification (the shorthand label given to all of the 
procedures that agencies must satisfy before creating new rules) 
without considering those situations in which it may expand 
rather than contract an agency’s options. Of course, it may make 
more sense for Congress to create different commitment mecha-
nisms because the procedures that cause ossification are too blunt 
for this purpose or because they impose costs apart from agency 
delay. In fact, it is a fair question whether we should even want 
agencies to regulate into the future. Such analysis, however, 
should be the future of the ossification literature. Discussing 
ossification without considering how it creates the stickiness that 
agencies use to regulate across time is incomplete. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I sets the stage by dis-
cussing ossification, agency efforts to regulate into the future, and 
credible commitment mechanisms in administrative law. Part II, 
in turn, sets forth this Article’s theoretical contribution: that 
ossification can act as a commitment mechanism enabling the 
creation of sticky regulations, thus expanding an agency’s long-
term options. Part III then gives examples of sticky regulations 
in action. Finally, Part IV sets out a preliminary agenda for 
future scholarship. For instance, and perhaps most important, 
should agencies be able to use sticky regulations to regulate 
across time or is this power too dangerous? And if agencies should 
be able to promulgate sticky regulations, is ossification the best 
commitment mechanism or should Congress create a different one? 
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I.  SETTING THE STAGE 
This Part reviews the ossification literature, with a focus on 
those procedures that are said to delay or hinder regulatory action. 
Likewise, it explains the fourth dimension of administrative 
law—the idea that agency officials do more than regulate current 
conditions but also seek to direct future innovation and other 
sorts of long-run investment. And third, it discusses credible 
commitment mechanisms in the context of the regulatory state. 
A. The Ossification Thesis 
It is no secret that agencies can do a lot through rulemaking. 
When an agency uses this tool, it can create a legal instrument 
that is just as “binding on regulated persons and entities as are 
the laws passed by Congress and signed by the President.”37 
Because this device is so powerful, it is unsurprising that agencies 
often use rulemaking—including for significant policies. 
At bottom, the ossification thesis argues that although 
rulemaking is used frequently, it should be used even more 
frequently. Rulemaking is not used as often as it should be, the 
thesis goes, because all three branches of the federal government 
have imposed onerous procedural requirements on rulemaking. 
Some scholars think that these procedures are bad in and of 
themselves, for instance, because they produce too many errors 
due to the judiciary’s supposed inability to evaluate complex 
scientific matters,38 or because they enable undue politicization of 
what should be a technocratic process.39 Many believe, however, 
these procedures are good in that they improve the quality and 
legitimacy of the resulting regulations, but that they are not good 
enough to justify the burdens they impose on agencies.40 Thus, on 
net, advocates of the thesis often urge that these procedures 
should be curtailed despite the good that they do because they 
prevent an even better thing—prompt action—from occurring. 
 
 37 Yackee and Yackee, 80 Geo Wash L Rev at 1416 (cited in note 20). 
 38 See, for example, Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, 
and Judicial Review as Translation of Agency Science, 109 Mich L Rev 733, 755 (2011) 
(contrasting generalist judges and expert agencies). 
 39 See, for example, Sidney Shapiro, Elizabeth Fisher, and Wendy Wagner, The 
Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 Wake 
Forest L Rev 463, 478–79 (2012) (“The countless meetings between industry interests and 
OIRA undoubtedly are about regulatory costs, and the public interest community lacks an 
equal opportunity to focus OIRA on regulatory benefits.”). 
 40 See, for example, Vermeule, 122 Harv L Rev at 1144 (cited in note 5). 
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1. The APA’s simple version of rulemaking. 
When one speaks of rulemaking, what often is meant is 
notice-and-comment (or informal) rulemaking for legislative 
rules.41 This type of rulemaking is generally governed by the 
procedures set out in § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act42 
(APA).43 For instance, an agency must publish a “notice of 
proposed rule making” in the Federal Register, “give interested 
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through 
submission of written data, views, or arguments,” and then 
“[a]fter consideration of the relevant matter presented, the 
agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general 
statement of their basis and purpose.”44 The APA does not appear 
to call for much content in the notice of proposed rulemaking.45 
And beyond having to consider public comments, the agency’s 
only responsibility is to “incorporate . . . a concise general statement 
of their basis and purpose.”46 These procedures were not always 
thought of as particularly onerous. For instance, “[t]he ‘concise 
general statement of basis and purpose’ for the original primary 
and secondary ambient air quality standards promulgated under 
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 consisted of a single page 
in the Federal Register when they were promulgated in 1971.”47 
Rulemaking thus was thought of as a “flexible and efficient 
process” to make policy.48 
 
 41 Formal rulemaking—with trial-like procedures—also exists, but it has been 
pushed into near desuetude. See Aaron L. Nielson, In Defense of Formal Rulemaking, 75 
Ohio St L J 237, 242–53 (2014) (explaining the demise of formal rulemaking). See also 
Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process, 59 Stan L Rev 601, 670–71 (2006) (explaining how 
formal rulemaking may impose too many procedural burdens). And rulemaking for non-
legislative rules also exists, though that literature is beyond the scope of this Article. See, 
for example, Cass R. Sunstein, “Practically Binding”: General Policy Statements and 
Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking, 68 Admin L Rev 491, 513–15 (2016) (addressing the 
difficulty of distinguishing legislative rules from policy statements); David L. Franklin, 
Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 Yale L J 276, 
282–89 (2010) (similar). 
 42 60 Stat 237 (1946), codified as amended in various sections of Title 5. 
 43 See 5 USC § 553. 
 44 5 USC § 553(b)–(c). 
 45 See 5 USC § 553(b) (“The notice shall include—(1) a statement of the time, place, 
and nature of public rule making proceedings; (2) reference to the legal authority under 
which the rule is proposed; and (3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a 
description of the subjects and issues involved.”). 
 46 5 USC § 553(c). 
 47 McGarity, 41 Duke L J at 1387 (cited in note 19), citing generally Environmental 
Protection Agency, National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards, 36 
Fed Reg 8186 (1971), amending 42 CFR Part 410. 
 48 See McGarity, 41 Duke L J at 1385 (cited in note 19). 
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2. The modern version of rulemaking. 
These bare-boned procedures, however, have been fleshed out 
over time—to the consternation of those who feel that too many 
procedures can be problematic. Indeed, in his pathbreaking 
article introducing the ossification thesis, Professor Thomas 
McGarity bemoaned that “[a]n assortment of analytical require-
ments have been imposed on the simple rulemaking model, and 
evolving judicial doctrines have obliged agencies to take greater 
pains to ensure that the technical bases for rules are capable of 
withstanding judicial scrutiny.”49 In today’s world, no one would 
say that the procedures for notice-and-comment rulemaking are 
simple. 
a) Judicially created procedures.  The federal judiciary 
often receives the brunt of the blame for the rise of administrative 
proceduralism.50 It has been claimed, for instance, that “judges on 
the [DC Circuit]—with considerable support from the surrounding 
political and academic communities—decided that the procedures 
for informal rulemaking provided by the APA were inadequate to 
allow effective legal control of agencies,” and so replaced them 
with more stringent ones.51 Whether this is an accurate summary 
is a question for another day. For our purpose here, however, it is 
enough to observe that the judiciary has come to enforce many 
procedural requirements. 
The APA, for instance, does not explicitly say anything about 
requiring agencies to turn over the data they intend to use in the 
final rule as part of the notice of proposed rulemaking. Yet in 
1973’s Portland Cement Association v Ruckelshaus52 decision, the 
DC Circuit declared that “[i]t is not consonant with the purpose 
of a rule-making proceeding to promulgate rules on the basis of 
inadequate data, or on data that, [to a] critical degree, is known 
only to the agency.”53 The result is the so-called Portland Cement 
doctrine, which requires agencies to provide that data up front. 
The reason for this doctrine is easy to see: How can the public 
meaningfully comment on agency proposals without even seeing 
 
 49 Id. 
 50 See Yackee and Yackee, 80 Geo Wash L Rev at 1425–26 (cited in note 20) (“Ossifica-
tion scholars, including Professor McGarity, tend to fault all three branches of government 
for the gross inefficiencies in modern day rulemaking. Their main criticisms, however, are 
aimed at the courts.”), citing McGarity, 41 Duke L J at 1396–1436 (cited in note 19). 
 51 Jack M. Beermann and Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 Geo 
Wash L Rev 856, 857 (2007). 
 52 486 F2d 375 (DC Cir 1973). 
 53 Id at 393. 
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the agency’s data?54 But this enhanced participation comes at a 
cost. Agencies must be able to anticipate what data the final rule 
will be based on, requiring more work up front. 
The judiciary has also played a role in fostering the “material 
comments” doctrine. Specifically, the APA has been interpreted 
such that not only must an agency solicit comments from the pub-
lic, but it also must then respond to all “material” or “significant” 
ones—in other words, those comments that, if true, would cast 
real doubt on the agency’s decision.55 Again, the reason for such a 
procedure is obvious: How else can courts ensure that the public 
views are considered by agencies if agencies do not need to engage 
with those views on the record?56 Indeed, due process itself argu-
ably sometimes may require agencies to confront what regulated 
parties say.57 Yet as commenting becomes easier, sorting through 
comments to determine which ones are material becomes 
harder.58 Moreover, as the number of comments increases, the 
amount of analysis the agency must include in its decision also 
increases. 
Likewise, courts enforce the “logical outgrowth” doctrine.59 
Specifically, courts have interpreted the APA to require a nexus 
between the proposed and final regulation in an attempt to 
 
 54 See American Radio Relay League, Inc v Federal Communications Commission, 
524 F3d 227, 237 (DC Cir 2008) (stating that it is “a fairly obvious proposition that studies 
upon which an agency relies in promulgating a rule must be made available during the 
rulemaking in order to afford interested persons meaningful notice and an opportunity for 
comment”). 
 55 See City of Portland v Environmental Protection Agency, 507 F3d 706, 714–15 (DC 
Cir 2007) (“EPA is required to give reasoned responses to all significant comments in a 
rulemaking proceeding. Significant comments are those which, if true, raise points rele-
vant to the agency’s decision and which, if adopted, would require a change in an agency’s 
proposed rule.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 56 See Home Box Office, Inc v Federal Communications Commission, 567 F2d 9, 35–36 
(DC Cir 1977) (“[T]he opportunity to comment is meaningless unless the agency responds to 
significant points.”). 
 57 See Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of Admin-
istrative Lawmaking, 46 Ga L Rev 117, 193 (2011) (noting due process concerns when 
“administrative agencies [ ] make federal law without engaging in an adequately fair and 
deliberative decision-making process”). 
 58 See Bridget C.E. Dooling, Legal Issues in e-Rulemaking, 63 Admin L Rev 893, 900 
(2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted): 
As currently designed, e-Rulemaking reduces the costs of viewing proposals and 
submitting comments, especially when the proposals and calls for comments are 
aggregated on a government-wide website such as Regulations.gov. The risk of 
this approach to e-Rulemaking is that quality input will be lost; malicious, irrel-
evant material will rise to the surface, and information will not reach those who 
need it. 
 59 See generally Phillip M. Kannan, The Logical Outgrowth Doctrine in Rulemaking, 
48 Admin L Rev 213 (1996) (discussing the origins and applications of the doctrine). 
98 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:85 
ensure the fairness of the notice-and-comment process;60 for 
instance, if an agency can pick something completely different 
from what was proposed, how could regulated parties provide 
meaningful comments? The DC Circuit thus has explained that 
allowing agencies to propose one thing and then issue something 
else “would hardly promote the purposes of the APA’s notice 
requirement.”61 Again, however, this requirement makes rule-
making more difficult for agencies. In framing the notice of 
proposed rulemaking, after all, the agency must preemptively 
assess which possible paths it may choose and include them so 
that regulated parties can comment. This, too, increases the 
agency’s burden. 
After an agency has gone through all of these steps (and oth-
ers, as explained below), its rule is subject to judicial review. In 
that review, courts will employ the hard-look doctrine to review the 
agency’s policy judgments. Hard-look review, perhaps more than 
anything else, is blamed for ossification.62 The doctrine “require[s] 
agencies to offer detailed explanations for their decisions, to pro-
vide strong justifications for any departures from past decisions, 
to permit widespread public participation in the rulemaking pro-
cess, and to consider alternative regulatory measures to those 
proposed.”63 The Supreme Court famously embraced hard-look 
review in 1983’s Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the 
United States, Inc v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co64 decision, explaining that at least as a general matter, an 
agency decision is 
arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors 
which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely 
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered 
an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evi-
dence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not 
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.65 
Because agencies know that this hard-look review is waiting for 
them, they are forced to take a large number of procedural steps 
 
 60 See id at 215–16. 
 61 CSX Transportation, Inc v Surface Transportation Board, 584 F3d 1076, 1082 (DC 
Cir 2009). 
 62 See Yackee and Yackee, 80 Geo Wash L Rev at 1426 (cited in note 20). 
 63 Id. 
 64 463 US 29 (1983). 
 65 Id at 43. 
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beforehand to prevent invalidation of their rules.66 Just how 
“hard” this form of review is in practice is debated, but most agree 
that it causes agencies to expend more energy up front than they 
would without it.67 
b) Presidentially created procedures.  Courts, however, are 
not the only branch blamed for ossification—the White House is, 
too.68 In particular, through the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) and OIRA, the White House has more often begun 
to insert itself into regulatory decisions. For instance, President 
Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12291—and later Executive 
Order 12498—which forced executive agencies to submit many 
proposed rules to the White House before they could go into effect, 
plus “major rules” became subject to cost-benefit analysis.69 
Although President Bill Clinton rescinded these orders, he issued 
an Executive Order of his own—Number 1286670—that in many 
respects required the same things.71 These procedures, moreover, 
largely remain in effect today. In fact, “although President George 
W. Bush modified Clinton’s Order No. 12,866 towards the end of 
his presidency, the changes have been characterized as ‘largely 
symbolic’ and, in any event, were promptly overturned by 
President Obama.”72 And “[a]fter returning to Clinton’s Order No. 
12,866, Obama eventually ordered changes of his own, but they 
too were [relatively] minor.”73 
This White House involvement in the regulatory process has 
prompted a great deal of scholarship. The purpose, at least in 
part, behind such presidential participation is to improve the 
content of rules, including by ensuring that the benefits of rules 
 
 66 See Yackee and Yackee, 80 Geo Wash L Rev at 1427–28 (cited in note 20) (altera-
tion in original): 
How precisely does heightened judicial review lead to ossification? As Professor 
McGarity explains it, heightened standards of judicial review force agencies to 
undertake a “Herculean effort of assembling the record and drafting a preamble 
[explaining the rule as published in the Federal Register] capable of meeting 
judicial requirements for written justification.” 
 67 See id at 1427 (collecting citations). 
 68 See id at 1428. 
 69 See Executive Order 12291 § 3(d) (1981), 3 CFR 127, 129. 
 70 See Executive Order 12866 (1993), 3 CFR 638. 
 71 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv L Rev 2245, 2285–86 
(2001) (arguing that Executive Order 12866 “retained the most important features of 
President Reagan’s oversight system”). 
 72 Aaron L. Nielson, Visualizing Change in Administrative Law, 49 Ga L Rev 757, 
789 (2015) (citation omitted). 
 73 Id at 789–90. See also Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation under Presidential 
Review, 126 Harv L Rev 1755, 1768–70 (2013) (discussing this history). 
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outweigh their costs.74 Even if that purpose is met—which critics 
sometimes doubt—there is, however, no question that this sort of 
review slows the regulatory process; in fact, “[t]he mere act of 
oversight itself may delay rule promulgation, as agencies must 
wait for OMB to review proposals and must respond to any OMB 
concerns.”75 Likewise, because agencies know that OIRA will 
scrutinize proposed rules, agencies again must engage in more 
work up front to satisfy that review.76 
c) Congressionally created procedures.  Finally, Congress 
also has created additional procedures for agencies beyond those 
set out in the APA. This is obviously true in those situations in 
which Congress requires an agency to engage in hybrid rule-
making, as with the Magnuson-Moss Act77 and the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC).78 The FTC, for instance, must provide a notice 
that “stat[es] with particularity the text of the rule . . . and the 
reason for the proposed rule,” and also a preliminary regulatory 
analysis that describes, among other things, whether there are 
“reasonable alternatives to the proposed rule.”79 After all of that, 
the FTC must provide an oral hearing if anyone asks for one, 
 
 74 See Sunstein, 126 Harv L Rev at 1864 (cited in note 14) (“OIRA is charged with 
ensuring (to the extent permitted by law) that the benefits of rules justify the costs and 
that the agency has selected the approach that maximizes net benefits. These two princi-
ples are exceedingly important, and they matter both to rulemaking agencies and in OIRA 
review.”) (citation omitted); Yackee and Yackee, 80 Geo Wash L Rev at 1430 (cited in note 
20) (“The modern regime of presidential oversight was intended to promote ‘political 
accountability, interagency coordination, rational priority setting, and cost-effective 
rulemaking’ and to ‘curb[ ] . . . the regulatory excesses of overzealous bureaucrats bent on 
promoting their agencies’ narrow agendas.’”) (alterations in original), quoting Nicholas 
Bagley and Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 Colum 
L Rev 1260, 1261 (2006). 
 75 Yackee and Yackee, 80 Geo Wash L Rev at 1430 (cited in note 20). 
 76 See id (“Compiling cost-benefit (or regulatory impact) analyses can also be costly 
and time consuming. As agencies devote more resources to meeting White House analytic 
demands, they will have fewer resources to devote to their core regulatory functions.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 77 Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub L 
No 93-637, 88 Stat 2183 (1975), codified at 15 USC § 2301 et seq. 
 78 See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, It’s Time to Remove the “Mossified” Procedures for FTC 
Rulemaking, 83 Geo Wash L Rev 1979, 1982 (2015) (“The FTC’s rulemaking procedures 
go far beyond the relatively streamlined notice-and-comment procedures mandated in 
Section 553 of the APA to which most agencies are subject.”). But see William D. Dixon, 
Rulemaking and the Myth of Cross-Examination, 34 Admin L Rev 389, 423–38 (1982) 
(defending hybrid rulemaking). 
 79 Lubbers, 83 Geo Wash L Rev at 1982–83 (cited in note 78), quoting 15 USC 
§§ 57a(b)(1), 57b-3(b)(1). 
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which can include cross-examination.80 And so on.81 Even if 
Congress does not impose special procedures for everything that 
an agency does, moreover, it might do so for particular statutes. 
For instance, the Clean Air Act82 sometimes requires hybrid rule-
making by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).83 
Congress also has enacted legislation that applies to rule-
making in general. For instance, “the Regulatory Flexibility Act 
. . . requires agencies to prepare a special analysis whenever a 
proposed rule will pose a ‘significant economic impact on a sub-
stantial number of small entities.’”84 Similarly, the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 199585 “requires agencies to consider how their 
rules may increase the information collection costs of the 
regulated public,” while the National Environmental Policy Act of 
196986 “requires agencies to prepare environmental impact state-
ments for major federal actions that may significantly affect the 
environment.”87 And “the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 
generally requires agencies to meet a number of procedural 
requirements, including, significantly, cost-benefit analysis and a 
duty to identify the least burdensome regulatory approach, for 
rules that impose costs greater than $100 million or more in a 
year.”88 Congress has also “require[d] agencies to ascertain, if 
possible, how a rule will impact small businesses and to consider 
whether those effects could be minimized.”89 
3. The ossification thesis and proposed reforms. 
Administrative law bubbles over with disagreement about 
each of these procedures. Scholars debate, for instance, whether 
OIRA review results in higher-quality regulation and whether 
 
 80 See Lubbers, 83 Geo Wash L Rev at 1983 (cited in note 78), citing 15 USC 
§ 57a(b)(1)(C), (c)(2)(B). 
 81 See Lubbers, 83 Geo Wash L Rev at 1983–84 (cited in note 78) (listing additional 
procedures). 
 82 Pub L No 88-206, 77 Stat 392 (1963), codified as amended at 42 USC § 7401 et seq. 
 83 See Richard B. Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative 
Procedure, 91 Harv L Rev 1804, 1822 n 66 (1978) (“The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 
. . . amended § 307 of the Clean Air Act . . . to provide for use by the Environmental 
Protection Agency of hybrid ‘paper hearing’ rulemaking procedures that to a considerable 
extent codify the procedures evolved through lower court decisions and agency response.”). 
 84 Yackee and Yackee, 80 Geo Wash L Rev at 1430–31 (cited in note 20), quoting 5 
USC § 602(a)(1). 
 85 Pub L No 104-13, 109 Stat 163, codified at 44 USC § 3501 et seq. 
 86 Pub L No 91-190, 83 Stat 852, codified as amended at 42 USC § 4321 et seq. 
 87 Yackee and Yackee, 80 Geo Wash L Rev at 1431 (cited in note 20). 
 88 Nielson, 49 Ga L Rev at 784 (cited in note 72), citing 2 USC §§ 1532, 1535. 
 89 Nielson, 49 Ga L Rev at 784–85 (cited in note 72), citing 5 USC §§ 601–02. 
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hard-look review results in judicial invalidation of what should be 
valid regulations. Likewise, a great deal of scholarship questions 
whether the judiciary’s interpretation of the APA is lawful.90 
The ossification thesis (at least in its pure form, that is, 
ossification qua ossification) is different. Rather than challenging 
the efficacy or legality of these procedures, it contends that even 
if they introduce more fairness and rationality into the rulemak-
ing process, they are not cost justified because they unduly hinder 
agencies, and agency agility is a good thing in its own right.91 In 
short, “these various judicially, presidentially, and congressionally 
imposed constraints allegedly prevent[ ] agencies from promul-
gating necessary or desirable regulations, or at least excessively 
delay[ ] promulgation.”92 
Many scholars thus urge that rulemaking be simplified—
sometimes in dramatic ways. For instance, Professor Frank Cross 
has sought “the total elimination of judicial review” as a solution 
to ossification,93 while others urge greater use of “‘soft glance’ 
review” for “certain sensitive areas.”94 Some seek the elimination 
of “OMB-mandated cost-benefit analysis.”95 And others urge 
greater use of negotiated rulemaking, which they hope will require 
fewer procedures.96 Thus, “the threat of ossification has led 
 
 90 See, for example, Beermann and Lawson, 75 Geo Wash L Rev at 882–88 (cited in 
note 51); Richard J. Pierce Jr, Waiting for Vermont Yankee III, IV, and V? A Response to 
Beerman and Lawson, 75 Geo Wash L Rev 902, 906–07 (2007); Richard J. Pierce Jr, Waiting 
for Vermont Yankee II, 57 Admin L Rev 669, 675–82 (2005); Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial 
Review of Informal Rulemaking: Waiting for Vermont Yankee II, 55 Tulane L Rev 418, 
420–26 (1981). 
 91 See Vermeule, 122 Harv L Rev at 1144 (cited in note 5) (noting the “opportunity 
costs” of procedures intended to encourage “the rationality of agency policymaking”). 
 92 Yackee and Yackee, 80 Geo Wash L Rev at 1418 (cited in note 20). 
 93 Id at 1434, citing generally Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial 
Review of Rulemaking, 85 Va L Rev 1243 (1999). 
 94 Barnett, 90 NYU L Rev at 61 (cited in note 21), citing Wendy E. Wagner, 
Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 Duke L J 1321, 1409 
(2010). See also Cristina M. Rodríguez, Constraint through Delegation: The Case of 
Executive Control over Immigration Policy, 59 Duke L J 1787, 1836 n 144 (2010) (discuss-
ing situations, such as immigration-related cases, in which courts might decline to engage 
in hard-look review). 
 95 Yackee and Yackee, 80 Geo Wash L Rev at 1434–35 (cited in note 20). 
 96 See id at 1433. See also David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: 
Rethinking the Role of the Rational Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89 Cal L Rev 917, 
956–57 (2001) (“One prescription for the ossification problem is the increased use of bar-
gaining between interested stakeholders to identify better, more adaptive rules. Compared 
with more adversarial and formal procedures, informal bargaining enables stakeholders 
to share information and build trust . . . or so the argument goes.”) (citation omitted). 
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scholars to propose a number of potentially far reaching reforms 
to the federal regulatory process.”97 
4. The empirical fight. 
The extent to which the ossification thesis is accurate is 
disputed. Many scholars and policymakers believe, however, that 
ossification is a serious problem.98 That said, one of the leading 
empirical studies on ossification casts some doubt on the thesis, 
at least if the thesis is stated robustly. In 2012, Professors Jason 
and Susan Webb Yackee examined rulemaking from 1950 to 1990 
to explore whether there was a material change in the amount of 
time it takes to promulgate rules following the increase in proce-
dural requirements in the 1970s. They conclude that “evidence 
that ossification is either a serious or widespread problem is 
mixed and relatively weak” and that there is reason to think that 
“agencies remain able to propose and promulgate historically 
large numbers of regulations, and to do so relatively quickly.”99 
This view finds some empirical support from other studies.100 
In response, Professor Richard Pierce has stated that “virtu-
ally all experienced administrative law scholars . . . accept[ ] the 
ossification hypothesis as true and important,” and he urges that 
“[t]he hypothesis is supported by a large body of evidence.”101 
Specifically, Pierce argues that the Yackee and Yackee study is 
flawed because it does not include the time leading up to the 
 
 97 Yackee and Yackee, 80 Geo Wash L Rev at 1436 (cited in note 20). Notably, 
Professor Mark Seidenfeld challenges the ossification thesis on the theory that sometimes 
we should not want agencies to act because agencies may have suboptimal incentives. See 
Seidenfeld, 70 Ohio St L J at 252–53 (cited in note 20). 
 98 There may be some support for this view. For instance, a recent report by an ad-
vocacy group finds that “since 1996, it has taken OSHA an average of 12 years to produce 
a single Economically Significant rule.” Public Citizen, Unsafe Delays *5 (June 28, 2016), 
archived at http://perma.cc/L55R-EH6P. 
 99 Yackee and Yackee, 80 Geo Wash L Rev at 1421–22 (cited in note 20). 
 100 See, for example, Stephen M. Johnson, Ossification’s Demise? An Empirical Analysis 
of EPA Rulemaking from 2001–2005, 38 Envir L 767, 770 (2008): 
I discovered that the rules finalized by EPA during that time period were final-
ized, on average, within 1.5 to 2 years after publication as proposed rules, much 
faster than the 3 to 5 years cited in many articles as the post ossification standard. 
. . . For rules finalized between 2001 and 2005, EPA generally took about the 
same amount of time to finalize rules subject to OMB review as it took for the 
agency to finalize rules not subject to OMB review. 
See also, for example, Jordan, 94 Nw U L Rev at 396 (cited in note 20) (“My ultimate 
conclusion is that judicial review in the D.C. Circuit under the hard look version of the 
arbitrary and capricious standard generally did not significantly impede agencies in the 
pursuit of their policy goals during the decade under review.”). 
 101 Pierce, 80 Geo Wash L Rev at 1494 (cited in note 11). 
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notice of proposed rulemaking.102 He also says that the ossification 
thesis does not apply to all or indeed even most rulemakings.103 
Instead, “[o]ssification is a problem only in the context of the 
much smaller number of rulemakings that raise controversial 
issues where the stakes are high.”104 Indeed, “[e]very study of 
economically significant rulemakings has found strong evidence 
of ossification—a decisionmaking process that takes many years 
to complete and that requires an agency to commit a high propor-
tion of its scarce resources to a single task.”105 
B. The Fourth Dimension 
The ossification debate largely focuses on the opportunity 
costs caused by the procedural requirements agencies must sat-
isfy when they promulgate regulations. The focus is often on what 
rules have already been thwarted or that are being thwarted right 
now. This focus, although important, is also incomplete. Regula-
tion also extends to the future. We all know humans often think 
beyond the here and now. Essentially every student investing in 
“human capital” is prioritizing future consumption over present 
pleasure. Similar analysis occurs within private organizations—
especially in markets that require large amounts of capital. Such 
organizations also regularly think about how to obtain future 
profits.106 Hence, it is not uncommon to make investments that 
will require years or even decades of future returns to pay off. 
The future matters, however, to more than just private 
parties. Agencies also care. Sometimes, for instance, Congress 
requires agencies to take actions with an eye on future innova-
tion.107 And sometimes agencies do so without an explicit charge 
from Congress; a general grant of authority to regulate “in the 
 
 102 See id at 1495–96 (“First, by looking only at the time between issuance of the 
NPRM and issuance of the final rule, they understate significantly the total time needed 
to issue a rule through the notice and comment procedure.”). 
 103 See id at 1497 (“The vast majority of the thousands of rulemakings conducted by 
agencies each year involve issues that are not particularly controversial or that do not 
have major economic consequences.”). 
 104 Id at 1498. 
 105 Pierce, 80 Geo Wash L Rev at 1498 (cited in note 11), citing Yackee and Yackee, 
80 Geo Wash L Rev at 1418 nn 15–19, 1419 n 22 (cited in note 20). 
 106 See Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation, 80 Geo Wash L Rev 764, 
805–08 (2012) (explaining why corporations have long investment horizons). 
 107 See, for example, La Pierre, 62 Iowa L Rev at 805–08 (cited in note 25) (discussing 
how Congress empowered the EPA to force industries to develop pollution-reduction 
technologies). 
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public interest” may be enough.108 Agencies thus regularly create 
incentives to encourage regulated parties to develop the future in 
a certain way. And even if the agency is not creating a formal 
incentive, the efficacy of its rule may depend on the regulated 
community’s cooperation. After all, the agency may want a certain 
amount of private participation, while investors may be willing to 
invest in a scheme at a certain “price” (broadly defined) but be 
wary of doing so if the price may increase substantially. 
1. The fourth dimension of private behavior. 
There is a great deal of literature discussing the trade-offs 
between present consumption and future investment.109 The basic 
idea is that investors will invest in the future if the benefits of 
doing so outweigh the costs, with future benefits discounted using 
net present value calculations.110 
The formula driving business decisions goes something like 
this: A company should invest if the current costs of doing so are 
less than the projected future benefit of doing so, with that future 
benefit being discounted by the time value of money.111 And the 
 
 108 See, for example, Wendy M. Rogovin, The Regulation of Television in the Public 
Interest: On Creating a Parallel Universe in Which Minorities Speak and Are Heard, 42 
Cath U L Rev 51, 69–79 (1992) (discussing the authority of the Federal Communication 
Commission (FCC) to regulate “in the public interest” and how this power can be used to 
create incentives). 
 109 See, for example, Daniel A. Farber and Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of 
the Future: Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 Vand L Rev 267, 
280 (1993): 
Generally, investment of resources today generates a larger quantity of resources 
available for future consumption. Thus, the future return from investment 
(which itself represents forgone present consumption) is essentially a future flow 
of consumption. The interest rate, and thus the discount rate, reflect the oppor-
tunity cost of relinquishing present consumption. 
 110 See id at 277: 
The basic principle underlying discounting is simple: A dollar today is worth 
more than a dollar at some time in the future. This is the same “time value” 
principle that underlies the concept of interest. . . . The term “present value” 
describes the current value to the recipient of a benefit that will be conferred in 
the future. 
 111 As a formal matter: 
The[ ] rules for selecting value‐maximizing projects follow from the discounted 
cash flow process known as net present value analysis (NPV). Conventionally 
stated, NPV analysis compares the present value of a project’s initial investment 
( ) with the present value of project net cash flow (NCF) over its life, all 
discounted at an appropriate risk‐adjusted rate of return—essentially, the 
opportunity cost of capital: 
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projected benefit is measured by the good that will happen should 
the investment work, discounted by the probability of it not work-
ing. The upshot is that the more time an investment requires to 
generate returns, the greater those returns must be to justify that 
investment because money that will come later in time is worth 
less now. Moreover, the likelihood of obtaining those returns 
generally decreases the further into the future the investment 
goes because it becomes more difficult to predict what will 
happen, especially in dynamic industries.112 In short, the riskier 
an investment is, the greater the potential returns must be to 
justify the risks.113 
Even so, if the potential rewards are great enough, companies 
are willing to engage in long-term investment even though many 
projects will only be profitable, if at all, after many years. A 
factory, for instance, can cost tens of millions of dollars to build.114 
Such a huge investment almost certainly will not pay for itself in 
a single year. In deciding whether to build a factory today, and 
how to do so, a company must determine how much future reve-
nue the factory will generate, and how likely it is that the factory 
will be able to generate that revenue. Such a calculation requires 
careful evaluation of potential risks and a keen eye focused on the 
future. 
The same sort of analysis applies to decisions to engage in 
research and development. Entities will invest in developing new 
technologies if the monetary benefits of the technologies are 
substantial enough to justify the risk. Thus, the less likely it is 






Michael Curley, Net Present Value Criteria, in Cary L. Cooper and Chris Argyris, eds, V The 
Blackwell Encyclopedia of Management: Managerial Economics 139, 139 (Blackwell 1997). 
 112 See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, The FCC’s Knowledge Problem: How to Protect 
Consumers Online, 67 Fed Commun L J 203, 207 (2015) (“This problem is especially acute 
[in] industries that are characterized by disruptive change, because it is even more difficult 
to predict future effects when industry structures and paradigms transform over time.”). 
 113 See, for example, Gregory C. Jantz, Incentives for Electric Generation Infrastructure 
Development, 2 Tex J Oil Gas & Energy L 373, 377 (2007): 
Utility companies will construct new power plants only if they can be reasonably 
certain that they will profit from the new generation. Coal and gas-fired power 
plants are a significant capital expenditure, costing in the range of one billion 
dollars . . . . Because prices in several regions now fluctuate due to market 
demand, it is more difficult to predict future profits. In the time it takes to build 
a coal or gas-fired power plant, competitive forces may move prices to where it 
is no longer profitable to complete the project. 
 114 See id. 
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likely it is that the research will be pursued in the first place. 
Similarly, the lower the expected revenue becomes for the poten-
tial product, the less likely it is that the research will be pursued. 
At least at the margins, as risk increases, investment decreases. 
For reasons that are obvious from the foregoing, in deciding 
whether to invest in innovative technologies or other long-term 
projects, the regulatory framework that the entity operates 
within matters a great deal. Investment occurs “in the shadow of 
the law.”115 Private entities must account for the legal regime in 
determining how likely it is that they will be able to recoup a long-
term investment. If a party believes, for instance, that a current 
technology will be outlawed in the space of five years, it will not 
build a factory that depends on that technology, at least if it 
suspects that the factory will not pay for itself during that period. 
Likewise, businesses consider regulatory incentives. If, for in-
stance, building a factory in one way will result in tax or other 
forms of incentives, that fact will be considered in deciding how 
(and whether) to build a factory. Such an incentive would be con-
sidered in the “benefit” part of the entity’s investment decision. 
Simply put, “incentives matter.”116 
2. The fourth dimension of administrative law. 
Private entities, however, are not the only ones with an eye 
on the future. Agencies also often think long term in devising 
policies and strategies. To be sure, agencies often focus regulatory 
efforts on the here and now. For instance, when an agency bars 
certain types of currently available technologies from being used 
because of the immediate effects of those technologies, it is regu-
lating the present. The same is true when agency officials decide 
whether a drug should be approved because it is safe enough in 
light of the current research, whether radio spectrum should be 
cleared so it can be put to better immediate uses, or whether 
certain roads should be routed this way or that because of current 
demand. These are the typical sorts of things that one imagines 
when one thinks of regulation. 
Agencies, however, also look to regulate beyond the here and 
now—to encourage the development of the future. For example, 
 
 115 See generally, for example, Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining 
in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L J 950 (1979) (explaining how the 
law impacts bargaining in divorce negotiations). 
 116 Cass R. Sunstein, Simpler: The Future of Government 210 (Simon & Schuster 
2013) (arguing that regulated parties make calculated decisions based on costs and benefits 
and that government officials can modify incentives). 
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imagine that you are an official serving in the Obama administra-
tion. You are told that two futures are possible. In one, green 
power117 will constitute 50 percent of the total energy used in the 
United States in the year 2050. In the other, green power will 
constitute 20 percent of the total energy used. If you place a high 
value on green power, it is incredible to think that you would be 
indifferent between those two futures. Instead, if possible, 
common sense says that you would try to encourage the future 
with 50 percent.118 Nor is this analysis ideological. Imagine, for 
instance that you are an agency official in the Department of 
Education serving in the Trump administration. You are told that 
two futures are possible. In one, half of students will have access 
to private schools via vouchers, while in the other, only 20 percent 
will. You too would not be indifferent between those two out-
comes.119 When agency officials think about how to encourage the 
development of the future rather than how to bring about imme-
diate regulatory effects, they are entering the fourth dimension. 
And this happens more frequently than one might suspect. 
With the future in mind, Congress sometimes requires 
agencies to enter the fourth dimension—for instance when it 
mandates use of technology-forcing rules.120 This sort of regula-
tion requires private entities to improve the technology that they 
use, for example by increasing energy efficiency. When it comes 
to air quality, Congress explicitly requires the EPA to impose 
standards that are designed to force regulated parties to create 
new technologies.121 When agencies promulgate these sorts of 
 
 117 See What Is Green Power? (EPA, Oct 20, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/7MUE 
-Z4Y7 (“Green power is a subset of renewable energy and represents those renewable 
energy resources and technologies that provide the highest environmental benefit. EPA 
defines green power as electricity produced from solar, wind, geothermal, biogas, eligible 
biomass, and low-impact small hydroelectric sources.”). 
 118 See Alejandro E. Camacho and Robert L. Glicksman, Legal Adaptive Capacity: 
How Program Goals and Processes Shape Federal Land Adaptation to Climate Change, 87 
U Colo L Rev 711, 751–52 (2016) (explaining how agencies were instructed “to consider 
climate impacts in long-term planning”). 
 119 See Libby Nelson, Donald Trump’s Huge, Ambitious School Voucher Plan, Explained 
(Vox, Dec 2, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/2PA9-W5RU (“[Betsy] DeVos and Trump 
want to oversee the biggest change to American public education in half a century.”). 
 120 See American Petroleum Institute v Environmental Protection Agency, 706 F3d 
474, 480 (DC Cir 2013) (“[A]n agency may base a standard or mandate on future technology 
when there exists a rational connection between the regulatory target and the presumed 
innovation.”). 
 121 See Union Electric Co v Environmental Protection Agency, 427 US 246, 256–57 
(1976) (citation omitted): 
[T]he 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act were a drastic remedy to what was 
perceived as a serious and otherwise uncheckable problem of air pollution. The 
Amendments place the primary responsibility for formulating pollution control 
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regulations, they are thinking about the future. After all, the 
desired technology does not yet exist. 
Sometimes, however, agencies think about the fourth dimen-
sion without any express charge to do so. Agencies, for instance, 
may choose not to use a command-and-control approach to regu-
lation but instead may pick a particular outcome that regulated 
parties must meet.122 The purpose of choosing standards can also 
be to encourage innovation in a technology-forcing way. Some 
likewise argue that agencies sometimes can engage in other 
technology-forcing approaches, for instance through certain uses 
of so-called Pigouvian taxes in which regulated parties must pay 
for the social costs of their activities but are generally free to 
choose any form of technological approach to minimize those 
costs.123 
The government can create incentives for regulated parties 
to innovate in ways that officials prefer, for example through use 
of grants, subsidies, or other forms of “inducement.”124 Congress, 
of course, often creates incentives,125 for instance through tax 
policy.126 Agencies can do the same thing. For instance, the Home 
Affordable Modification Program was “created by the Department 
 
strategies on the States, but nonetheless subject the States to strict minimum 
compliance requirements. These requirements are of a “technology-forcing char-
acter,” and are expressly designed to force regulated sources to develop pollution 
control devices that might at the time appear to be economically or technologi-
cally infeasible. 
 122 See, for example, Bruce A. Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart, Comment, Reforming 
Environmental Law, 37 Stan L Rev 1333, 1334–36 (1985) (“[Best Available Technology] 
controls can ensure that established control technologies are installed. They do not, 
however, provide strong incentives for the development of new, environmentally superior 
strategies, and may actually discourage their development.”). 
 123 See, for example, Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner, Toward a Pigouvian 
State, 164 U Pa L Rev 93, 109 (2015) (“Numerous agencies, operating under a wide range 
of organic statutes and regulating a wide swath of the economy, have the authority to 
implement Pigouvian taxes.”). 
 124 See Ian Ayres and Amy Kapczynski, Innovation Sticks: The Limited Case for 
Penalizing Failures to Innovate, 82 U Chi L Rev 1781, 1790–99 (2015) (discussing various 
forms of innovation incentives). See also Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State 30 (John 
M. Olin Program in Law & Economics Working Paper No 39, 1996) (urging laws and pol-
icies be designed “to produce outcomes on the basis of incentives produced by democratic 
judgments”) (emphasis omitted). 
 125 See, for example, Davy v Central Intelligence Agency, 550 F3d 1155, 1158 (DC Cir 
2008) (explaining that Congress deliberately created an incentive to sue agencies). 
 126 See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government 
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv L Rev 705, 705 
(1970) (“Suggestions are constantly being made that many of our pressing social problems 
can be solved, or partially met, through the use of income tax incentives.”); Westinghouse 
Electric Corp v Tully, 466 US 388, 390 (1984) (explaining how Congress used “tax incen-
tives for U.S. firms to increase their exports”). 
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of Treasury and the Federal Housing Finance Agency” to “offer[ ] 
financial incentives to mortgage lenders to modify the home loans 
of borrowers in danger of foreclosure.”127 Likewise, the EPA, in 
consultation with the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, has authority under the Clean Air Act to designate 
economic development zones.128 The obvious purpose of such a 
designation is to encourage economic growth in some places 
rather than others.129 Similarly, the Department of Energy and 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission may attempt to 
create incentives for energy distribution to unfold in some ways 
rather than others.130 And the Fish and Wildlife Service is consid-
ering a program that “would give landowners credits for efforts 
they take that help declining species that are not listed as threat-
ened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act. Later, the 
credits could be redeemed to offset actions that hurt a species if it 
becomes listed under the act.”131 In proposing this plan, the agency 
was open about its desire to create “incentives” for regulated 
 
 127 Edwards v Aurora Loan Services, LLC, 791 F Supp 2d 144, 147 (DDC 2011). 
 128 See 42 USC § 7503(a)(1)(B). 
 129 See Environmental Protection Agency, Review of New Sources and Modifications 
in Indian Country, 76 Fed Reg 38748, 38750 (2011) (“In addition, these rules will provide 
regulatory certainty to allow for environmentally sound economic growth in Indian 
country.”). See also id at 38775 (describing a comment alleging that making Indian coun-
try an economic development zone “would create an incentive for industrial sources” to 
shift production there). 
 130 See, for example, Public Utilities Commission of California v Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, 367 F3d 925, 929 (DC Cir 2004): 
A primary purpose of the Federal Power Act, and its counterpart, the Natural 
Gas Act, “was to encourage the orderly development of plentiful supplies of 
electricity and natural gas at reasonable prices.” . . . [T]he Commission correctly 
argues that using pricing incentives to increase the supply of energy available 
to customers is a valid, non-cost consideration in setting rates. 
See also, for example, Texaco, Inc v Department of Energy, 663 F2d 158, 163 (DC Cir 1980) 
(“DOE recognized that the trans-Alaska pipeline had created a crude oil glut in the Western 
states, and sought to provide economic incentives for the production and transportation of 
California crude to Eastern refineries. DOE’s program contemplated the use of exception 
relief from entitlement obligations.”). 
 131 Ethan Howland, FWS Proposes Credits for Species Conservation Efforts (Roll Call, 
July 18, 2014) (available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 3538069). 
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parties to act in certain ways over the long run.132 This sort of 
program is far from uncommon.133 
The concept of “incentive,” moreover, goes beyond labels. 
Sometimes agencies may want some amount of an activity, but 
yet not create something called an “incentive” for it. Imagine, for 
instance, a situation with two competing technologies. The 
agency may prefer one over the other.134 It could create an incen-
tive to choose that technology, or it could regulate the disfavored 
technology less favorably than the favored technology.135 From the 
perspective of a regulated party, the two options are not that 
different. Indeed, in a sense, this is just a replay of the idea that 
tax credits and expenditures are interchangeable.136 If the govern-
ment has power to regulate, then its decision to not regulate can 
be seen as an incentive. 
C. Commitment Mechanisms in Administrative Law 
An agency’s ability to create incentives implicates the concept 
of commitment mechanisms—that is, devices to make promises 
 
 132 See Fish and Wildlife Service, Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 
Expanding Incentives for Voluntary Conservation Actions under the Endangered Species 
Act, 77 Fed Reg 28347, 28347 (2012) (advance notice of proposed rulemaking): 
We are considering whether and how we could revise our regulations to create 
incentives for landowners and others to take voluntary conservation actions to 
benefit species that may be likely to become threatened or endangered species, 
including revisions that could recognize the benefits of such conservation actions 
as offsetting the adverse effects of actions carried out after listing by that land-
owner or others. 
 133 See, for example, Mary V. Harris Foundation v Federal Communications Commission, 
776 F3d 21, 28 (DC Cir 2015) (allowing an agency to enforce a “bright-line rule” as an 
incentive for compliance); Cassell v Federal Communications Commission, 154 F3d 478, 
480 (DC Cir 1998) (“The purpose of the finder’s preference program was to create new 
incentives for persons to provide [the FCC] information about unconstructed, nonopera-
tional, or discontinued private land mobile radio systems.”) (quotation marks omitted); 
Altamont Gas Transmission Co v Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 92 F3d 1239, 
1247 (DC Cir 1996) (“The agency asserts that it simply created an incentive (by condition-
ally reducing PGT’s rate of return) for the CPUC and PG&E to behave in a manner that 
advances the public interest, i.e., to revise PG&E’s rate structure.”). 
 134 It is, of course, dangerous when agencies pick winners and losers—agencies may not 
be very good at it. That danger is discussed in greater detail below. See text accompanying 
notes 222–26. 
 135 See Ayres and Kapczynski, 82 U Chi L Rev at 1807–12 (cited in note 124) (arguing 
for consideration of “innovation sticks” to prompt desired innovation). 
 136 See Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v Winn, 563 US 125, 141–42 
(2011) (“It is easy to see that tax credits and governmental expenditures can have similar 
economic consequences.”). Of course, the idea that the government is offering an 
“incentive” by not regulating should not be taken too far in a free society. See id at 142 
(“When Arizona taxpayers choose to contribute to STOs, they spend their own money.”) 
(emphasis added). 
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credible. There also is a great deal of scholarship on commitment 
mechanisms—much of which has been developed in the context 
of game-theory economics.137 The basic question is how to make 
promises trustworthy enough that recipients will believe that 
should the triggering event happen, the promised reaction will 
actually occur. A good example arises in the context of interna-
tional relations. One nation may threaten another nation with 
war if the nation does some disfavored act. But how to make that 
threat credible so it is not dismissed as empty talk?138 The more 
confidence that a recipient of a promise has in the promise, the 
greater likelihood that the recipient will act in response to the 
promise. 
This is true in administrative law, too. Unfortunately, “the 
commitment of many regulatory bodies is fragile; it can break easily 
under pressure.”139 This is especially so because it is now a black-
letter principle that so long as an agency has discretion over a 
subject, agency officials in time period one generally cannot bind 
future agency officials in time period two. This is true in at least 
two respects. When it comes to questions of policy, agencies are 
free to change course—a point that is especially potent after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Fox.140 And when it comes to questions 
of law, agencies are also free to change course so long as the statute 
is ambiguous, even if a court has already interpreted the statute. 
This point was made clear in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Brand X that agencies are not always bound by prior judicial 
interpretations of the statutes they administer.141 Combined, the 
principles from Fox and Brand X mean agencies have a great deal 
of power to change regulatory schemes. 
In Fox, the Supreme Court addressed a change in FCC policy 
regarding “indecent expletives.”142 Initially, the FCC had required 
that the expletives be repeated, but the agency changed policy 
and concluded that repetition was not always required.143 The 
Second Circuit concluded that this revised policy—which was 
 
 137 For instance, Thomas  Schelling was awarded the Nobel Prize for his research on 
credible commitment mechanisms. The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in 
Memory of Alfred Nobel 2005: Robert J. Aumann, Thomas C. Schelling (Nobel Media, Oct 
10, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/76NR-QR88. 
 138 See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 6 (Harvard 1963). 
 139 Glenn Blackmon and Richard Zeckhauser, Fragile Commitments and the Regulatory 
Process, 9 Yale J Reg 73, 74 (1992). 
 140 See Fox, 556 US at 514–16. 
 141 See Brand X, 545 US at 982–83. 
 142 Fox, 556 US at 505. 
 143 Id at 507. 
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applied to various instances of expletives on television—was 
unlawful because agencies wishing to “reverse[ ] course” face a 
higher standard of justification than those creating policy in the 
first instance.144 The Supreme Court disagreed: “We find no basis 
in the Administrative Procedure Act or in our opinions for a re-
quirement that all agency change be subjected to more searching 
review.”145 Although reiterating the principle that “the require-
ment that an agency provide reasoned explanation for its action 
would ordinarily demand that it display awareness that it is 
changing position,” and stressing that “the agency must show 
that there are good reasons for the new policy,” the Fox Court 
nonetheless declared that “the agency need not always provide a 
more detailed justification than what would suffice for a new 
policy created on a blank slate.”146 Many believe that Fox makes 
it easier for agencies to change their minds.147 In any event, Fox 
shows that so long as agencies acknowledge that they are chang-
ing policy, officials in a later time period are not bound by the 
decisions reached by their predecessors. 
Brand X is similar, at least in effect. In Brand X, “the Court 
held that when an agency adopts one interpretation of an 
ambiguous regulatory statute and the interpretation is judicially 
upheld, the agency remains free to adopt a different interpreta-
tion later, if the second interpretation would otherwise be entitled 
to Chevron deference.”148 The question in Brand X concerned the 
phrase “telecommunications service.”149 The Ninth Circuit had 
determined “that cable modem service was a ‘telecommunications 
service,’” but the FCC, afterwards, reached a different conclusion.150 
The Supreme Court held that even though the Ninth Circuit had 
already construed this statute, the court still was obligated to 
defer to the agency’s interpretation because the statute was 
ambiguous.151 If the Ninth Circuit had previously held that the 
 
 144 See id at 514. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Fox, 556 US at 515. 
 147 See, for example, Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative 
Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 Duke L J 1811, 1813 (2012) (“Justice Scalia’s 
analysis in Fox signaled . . . a broadened acceptance of political justifications for changes 
in agency policy.”); Ronald M. Levin, Hard Look Review, Policy Change, and Fox Television, 
65 U Miami L Rev 555, 559–60 (2011) (“The Fox case provided Scalia an opportunity to 
prevail on his colleagues—or at least enough of them to compose a majority—to embrace 
this more accommodating attitude toward agencies’ changing their minds.”). 
 148 Levin, 65 U Miami L Rev at 560 (cited in note 147). 
 149 Brand X, 545 US at 974. 
 150 Id at 979–80. 
 151 See id at 980–82. 
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statute was unambiguous, only then could the court deny Chevron152 
deference.153 In other words, even a court decision upholding one 
reading of a statute is not always sufficient to prevent an agency 
from reversing course and reinterpreting the statute. In this way, 
“the thrust of [Brand X and Fox] was similar: The agency should 
be free to revise its position without being unduly impeded by 
either judicial precedent (Brand X) or the agency’s own prior 
views (Fox).”154 
The effect of Brand X and Fox is to make it easier for agencies 
to change policy. But an unintended consequence is that these cases 
remove commitment mechanisms to support agency incentives. As 
Professor Masur has observed, scholars “have overlooked the 
deleterious effects that Brand X’s extension of agency flexibility 
may have upon both outside parties and the agencies’ ability to 
accomplish their own regulatory objectives. Brand X adds an 
element of flexibility—and therefore instability—to agency 
authority,” thus making agency commitments less credible.155 If 
the Court had gone the other way, it would have created a “mech-
anism” by which an agency could generate “a constraining judicial 
decision, thus credibly committing itself to a given policy.”156 
Without such a mechanism, Masur fears that regulated parties 
will be less likely to trust agency-created incentives, thus hinder-
ing an agency’s ability to pursue favored longer-term policies.157 
Masur’s is the leading analysis on the downsides of weak 
commitment in administrative law, but he is not the only one to 
recognize the problem. Rather, economists too have identified the 
risk, especially in the context of rate regulation. A body of 
economics literature worries that once a capital-heavy project has 
been completed, rate-setting regulators will not respect sunk 
costs.158 Because regulators and regulated parties cannot enter 
 
 152 See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 
US 837 (1984). 
 153 Brand X, 545 US at 982 (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps 
an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court 
decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and 
thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”). 
 154 Levin, 65 U Miami L Rev at 560 (cited in note 147). 
 155 Masur, 60 Vand L Rev at 1038–39 (cited in note 24). 
 156 Id at 1039. 
 157 See id at 1040–41 (warning that “because neither agencies nor private parties can 
ever definitively settle or anchor the law, agencies will have great difficulty persuading 
private parties to rely on agency interpretations”). 
 158 See Howard A. Shelanski and J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network 
Industries, 68 U Chi L Rev 1, 29–30 & n 90 (2001) (collecting citations). 
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into long-term contracts to prevent agencies from picking a sub-
optimal rate in terms of recouping investment, regulated parties 
are less willing to invest in the first place, at least at the margins.159 
After all, “even when a commitment is made, a regulator’s prom-
ise of rates is much less costly to reverse than a firm’s investment 
of capital.”160 And although “[c]onstitutional guarantees” like due 
process “protect firms from outright, literal expropriation without 
compensation,” the “regulator can [still] rule that the firm’s profits 
are unreasonably high” and so dash the investment strategy.161 
This can harm the agency by reducing investment by regulated 
parties, even if the agency wants more investment. It follows that 
agencies can sometimes benefit from commitment mechanisms.162 
Yet where can an agency find a credible commitment mecha-
nism? In the private sector, this problem is solved by contract. 
One party will promise not to change the deal, and a court will 
act as a credible commitment mechanism to prevent that promise 
from being empty talk. When it comes to administrative law, how-
ever, an agency cannot contract not to change the regulatory 
scheme. Considering this problem, economists have latched onto 
a potential commitment mechanism: repeat-player dynamics. In 
particular, the fact that agencies know that if regulatory change 
ends up preventing regulated parties from recouping investments 
today, such parties will be less likely to continue to invest tomorrow. 
Such “once burned” regulated parties may opt to leave the market 
altogether rather than be burned again. Recognizing this, 
regulators may be careful before acting because “[t]he need for 
future investment funds binds regulators to good behavior in the 
present.”163 Yet economists also recognize that a repeat-player 
dynamic is not a perfect commitment mechanism, especially in 
industries in which there is not “a steady stream of demand for 
 
 159 See Blackmon and Zeckhauser, 9 Yale J Reg at 76 (cited in note 139) (“Because 
public utility systems require very large and long-lived investments, commitment is an 
especially important issue for utilities and regulators.”); id at 77 (“The fragility of regulatory 
commitments makes it more difficult and expensive to attract capital. A rational firm an-
ticipates its vulnerability and will not sink its capital unless it believes that the regulator 
will keep her commitments.”). 
 160 Id at 77. 
 161 Id. 
 162 See Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement 
and Regulation 53–54, 86–103 (MIT 1993) (“In the absence of a detailed long-term contract, 
the regulated firm may refrain from investing in the fear that once the investment is in 
place, the regulator would pay only for variable cost and would not allow the firm to recoup 
its sunk cost.”). 
 163 Blackmon and Zeckhauser, 9 Yale J Reg at 100 (cited in note 139). 
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new capital.”164 In sum, legal scholars and economists have recog-
nized the value of agency commitment mechanisms but have also 
concluded there may not always be one. 
II.  STICKY REGULATIONS: THE THEORY 
Now consider ossification—and the sticky regulations it 
creates. Although there is empirical disagreement about how 
prevalent ossification is, it is common ground among many 
administrative-law scholars that at least for the most significant 
regulations, agencies may spend years—sometimes more than a 
decade—to finalize a single rule.165 Agencies may even forgo issuing 
rules altogether because of how hard it can be.166 Especially for 
those who believe that the value of regulation often outweighs its 
costs, this is lamentable. The result is many proposals to reduce 
ossification. 
But what if procedural burdens sometimes help agencies rather 
than hurt them? This may be the case once sticky regulations are 
accounted for. Without what has come to be known as ossification, 
it would be more difficult for agencies to accomplish certain long-
term objectives. Ossification enables agencies to more credibly 
commit to regulatory programs because regulated parties know 
that even if the agency wanted to change the scheme in the future, 
it would be difficult to do so—the same procedures that make it 
hard to create policy also make it hard to rescind policy.167 Ossifi-
cation thus acts as a commitment mechanism. Absent this mech-
anism, basic economics suggests that regulated parties sometimes 
would be less likely to participate in the market, or at least to 
participate as much as the agency would like, because the invest-
ment would be riskier.168 This is especially true in capital-intensive 
 
 164 Id. 
 165 See, for example, Pierce, 75 Geo Wash L Rev at 919 (cited in note 90) (discussing 
how major rulemaking can take “many years to complete”). 
 166 See McGarity, 41 Duke L J at 1386 (cited in note 19) (“Perhaps of even more 
concern to regulatees and the general public is recent evidence that agencies are beginning 
to seek out alternative, less participatory regulatory vehicles to circumvent the increasingly 
stiff and formalized structures of the informal rulemaking process.”). See also Heather S. 
Fredriksen, Comment, The Roadless Rule That Never Was: Why Roadless Areas Should 
Be Protected through National Forest Planning Instead of Agency Rulemaking, 77 U Colo 
L Rev 457, 469–70 (2006) (discussing how “agencies are unwilling to invest their efforts in 
new rulemaking that is likely to be overturned by the courts”). 
 167 See Fredriksen, Comment, 77 U Colo L Rev at 469–70 (cited in note 166) (“The 
ossification theory, however, also applies to prevent revocation.”). 
 168 See Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 Bell J Econ 426, 
432–36 (1976) (explaining that regulated parties require at least some confidence that the 
market will be stable over the long run). 
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industries in which it takes years to recoup investments. Without 
confidence that the scheme will remain relatively stable, capital 
holders may decline to act as the agency prefers. 
This can be a problem for agencies that require private-sector 
cooperation to achieve long-term objectives. An agency thus can 
be better off if it can credibly tell regulated parties what the rules 
will be going forward. Doing so expands the scope of what an 
agency can do, at least in one sense—the future. To be sure, that 
ability to induce greater reliance by regulated parties comes at a 
price. The agency cannot change a policy at will, thus reducing 
the scope of what it can do in another sense—the present. But for 
agencies that place greater weight on the future than the present, 
the trade-off between short-term flexibility and long-run stability 
may cut in favor of ossification. 
In short, this Article’s theoretical contribution is straight-
forward. Because of ossification, it is more difficult for agencies 
to promulgate rules, meaning that regulated parties know ex ante 
that even if the agency ends up having a change of heart about 
the incentives it has created, it will take years of laborious efforts 
for that agency to do anything about it—a daunting prospect that 
may discourage the agency from even beginning to think about 
upsetting the status quo. No matter what happens in the future, 
the agency cannot snap its fingers and reshuffle the deck. This 
operates as a credible commitment mechanism against change. 
And because the procedural restraints on the agency are external 
(that is, they are enforced by courts and the White House), that 
mechanism is even more credible. Ossification, viewed this way, 
provides the stickiness that regulated parties need to trust 
agency incentives, at least at the margins. And this allows 
agencies to better accomplish long-term goals. Each step in this 
analysis is explained below. 
A. Ossification Slows Regulatory Change and Increases 
Certainty 
The primary concern with ossification qua ossification is that 
whatever the benefits of additional procedures may be, they come at 
too steep of an opportunity cost because they slow agency action.169 
Indeed, adherents to the ossification thesis fret that it can take 
 
 169 See notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
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years, even a decade, to promulgate a single rule.170 At the same 
time, ossification is said to be especially potent for the most 
significant regulations.171 These points are contested, but for 
purposes here, the first step of my analysis takes ossification as a 
given. Because of ossification, assume that agencies cannot 
quickly change the rules.172 On this assumption, the only way an 
agency can avoid spending a lot of time on regulatory change is 
by diverting resources away from other priorities. Even if an 
agency does divert resources, moreover, it still cannot just wish 
the law changed and make it so; procedural requirements inevi-
tably take some time. The result is that after a regulation has 
become final, regulated parties know that it cannot be changed 
immediately. 
The next step in the analysis involves simple microeconomics. 
Almost by definition, the more difficult it is for an agency to 
change its policy, the less likely it is that the agency will do so. It 
is a basic economic principle that as purchases become more 
“expensive,” generally less of the good is demanded because the 
opportunity cost increases. The same principle presumably ap-
plies in this context; as it becomes more “expensive” for agencies 
to change rules because of the time and resources they must 
expend to satisfy the relevant procedures, presumably there will 
be less change. Agencies do not have infinite resources and so 
have to prioritize. An example might help. Professor McGarity 
worries that because of ossification, agencies shift away from 
rulemaking in favor of less formal—in other words, less procedur-
ally burdensome—alternatives.173 But why would agencies do 
this? Because, from an economics perspective, those other forms 
of agency action are less “expensive.” In other words, substitution 
 
 170 See, for example, Pierce, 75 Geo Wash L Rev at 919 (cited in note 90) (“It is almost 
unheard of for a major rulemaking to be completed in the same presidential administra-
tion in which it began. A major rulemaking typically is completed one, two, or even three 
administrations later.”). 
 171 See, for example, Pierce, 80 Geo Wash L Rev at 1498 (cited in note 11) (explaining 
that ossification corresponds only “roughly to what the White House refers to as economically 
significant rules”). Counterintuitively, if the skeptics of the ossification thesis are correct 
that procedural requirements do not meaningfully delay regulatory change, the analysis 
in this Article may counsel in favor of additional procedures to ensure that delay does 
occur—that is, so long as policymakers believe that allowing agencies to make credible 
commitments is valuable. 
 172 See Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? 
An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U Chi L Rev 823, 868–69 (2006) (“[A]dminis-
trative law already ensures a high degree, and perhaps an excessively high degree, of 
stability. It is both time consuming and difficult to make a regulation . . . . To say the least, 
new presidents cannot immediately change agency policy as they see fit.”). 
 173 See McGarity, 41 Duke L J at 1386 (cited in note 19). 
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is occurring.174 But less formal mechanisms are also inferior in 
some respects. They do not create as much stability because they 
can also be changed more easily. 
To the extent that procedures make it harder for agencies to 
change the law, one can predict that the law will change less often 
once those procedures have been used. This dynamic creates 
increased regulatory certainty because regulated parties can be 
more confident that the regulatory scheme promulgated through 
formal procedures will not evolve. In this way, procedures that 
delay agency action create greater certainty, that is, a decreased 
risk that the agency will decommit from its promulgated policy.175 
Ossification, importantly, is also something that is imposed 
on agencies, meaning that although agencies can try to speed 
things along, they cannot evade ossification (to the extent it is 
real) altogether. For instance, courts engage in hard-look review; 
if the agency does not do what is necessary to satisfy that review, 
a federal judge will invalidate the agency action. In this way, a 
federal court ensures that the agency cannot quickly change its 
mind. From the perspective of creating stickiness, the fact that a 
federal judge—who is not part of the agency—is waiting in the 
wings to prevent the agency from changing the incentive scheme 
is valuable.176 
The same is true for White House review. OIRA, like a court, 
can also create greater regulatory certainty, for similar reasons. 
Although presumably regulated parties “trust” OIRA less than 
they do courts because OIRA is run by the same administration 
as the agency, the fact that OIRA is at least a step removed from 
the agency can only help create certainty. 
That these procedures are external to the agency therefore 
makes ossification a more credible commitment. If the procedures 
were not external, then when new officials really wanted to 
change the underlying policy, they might just seek to change the 
commitment mechanism too. It is a principle of game theory that 
 
 174 See Nielson, 105 Georgetown L J at 964 (cited in note 19) (explaining substitution). 
 175 See Randy J. Kozel and Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59 UCLA 
L Rev 112, 156–57 (2011) (“[S]tability usually is best promoted by limiting the frequency 
and degree of legal change.”). 
 176 For an example of courts facilitating commitment mechanisms in another context, 
see Pierre-Hugues Verdier and Mila Versteeg, International Law in National Legal Systems: 
An Empirical Investigation, 109 Am J Intl L 514, 525 (2015) (explaining how courts can 
be used as “commitment mechanisms” when it comes to treaty compliance). 
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“[t]hird parties can play a valuable role in making threats credi-
ble.”177 This is hardly surprising. If the point of the commitment 
mechanism is to credibly commit one party, the commitment 
becomes more credible to the extent that that very party has no 
control over the execution of the commitment. This insight applies 
to ossification.178 
B. Increased Regulatory Certainty Can Expand Agency 
Options 
Now comes the counterintuitive part: regulatory certainty 
expands agency options. Recall the investment formula used by 
private entities. An entity should invest if today’s costs of doing 
so are less than the projected future benefit, with that future 
benefit being discounted by the time value of money and the 
likelihood that the benefit will be obtained.179 Under this formula, 
the riskier future benefits are, the less valuable they are. And the 
less valuable tomorrow’s benefits are, the less money will be spent 
on investment today. The upshot is that the riskier an investment 
is, the less of the investment there will be. This can be bad for 
agencies. After all, if the agency creates a policy because it wants 
investment to help achieve one of the agency’s goals, the agency’s 
inability to credibly commit to that policy is a problem. 
Consider the following stylized example. Imagine that the 
president has directed the EPA to promulgate new regulations 
that would require (or create incentives for)180 existing electricity-
generation companies (EGCs) to source increasing percentages of 
their electricity from, say, next-generation nuclear fission plants 
over time. Imagine further that GenCorp is an EGC with opera-
tions throughout the western United States. In order to comply 
with the EPA’s desires, GenCorp will have to invest enormous 
sums of money in next-generation nuclear power plants. It will 
also take several years for these investments to generate income 
 
 177 Brigham Daniels, When Agencies Go Nuclear: A Game Theoretic Approach to the 
Biggest Sticks in an Agency’s Arsenal, 80 Geo Wash L Rev 442, 482 (2012). 
 178 See Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: Judicial 
and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 Vand L Rev 363, 380 (2010) (observing that 
“rulemaking also might be more stable than” some believe “because of ossification of the 
rulemaking process”). 
 179 See notes 110–11 and accompanying text. 
 180 As explained above, it does not matter which because, as a matter of economics, 
an incentive or a decision to regulate one thing more than another can be interchangeable. 
See note 136 and accompanying text. As this example demonstrates, therefore, credible 
commitment mechanisms can be valuable whenever the agency wants to encourage certain 
capital-heavy investment, even if the agency does not formally create an incentive for that 
investment. 
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for the company because it is so difficult and time consuming to 
construct nuclear power stations. Assume further that although 
GenCorp’s leadership believes the EPA’s proposed nuclear policy 
is generally sensible, it is worried that the president is likely to 
leave office soon and that his successor is unlikely to share his 
energy policy views. 
Assume that it will cost GenCorp a net present value of $100 
million to bring its mix of generation assets in line with the EPA’s 
proposal, and that it anticipates net present value revenues of 
$125 million from that investment if the current president’s pref-
erences, reflected in the regulation, hold in the future. In order to 
determine whether to make the up-front investment (and leaving 
aside for the moment any penalties that might accrue for its fail-
ure to do so), GenCorp must discount its anticipated $25 million 
profit from investing in nuclear power against the possibility that 
its investment will ultimately be unsuccessful. 
What will GenCorp do? Well, it depends on how easy it will 
be for the next administration to change the rules. First consider 
“Ossification World.” In Ossification World, GenCorp will assign 
a relatively high expected value to its investment. Or, put differ-
ently, it will not discount its anticipated future revenue stream 
too steeply on the basis of federal-level administrative-law 
political risk. In Ossification World, the appropriate discount rate 
might be as little as, say, 10 percent.181 This means that GenCorp 
must weigh a sum-certain investment of $100 million against a 
90 percent chance of a $125 million return. Thus, the expected 
value of GenCorp’s investment in nuclear generation would be: 
($125 million * 0.90) – $100 million = $12.5 million.182 
Now consider “Ossification-Free World”—that is, one in which 
agencies can change or even reverse course in a relatively nimble 
fashion. In Ossification-Free World, GenCorp estimates that it must 
discount its post-nuclear projected revenue stream by 30 percent. 
In this scenario, the expected value of GenCorp’s nuclear investment 
is negative: ($125 million * 0.7) – $100 million = –$12.5 million. In 
such a case, it would make sense for GenCorp to not make the 
 
 181 It is unlikely to be zero for a variety of reasons. For example, even without political 
risk, nuclear power plants are expensive and difficult to build, so there is some chance 
GenCorp simply will not be able to complete the project. 
 182 For purposes of this example, I assume only binary outcomes rather than the full 
spectrum of possible outcomes. The math would get more complicated with a more nuanced 
payoff model, but the intuitions would not change. 
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investment.183 Of course, once a company has already entered the 
market, its strategy might change; once a company has started 
selling energy, it may be hard to simply stop, even if the incen-
tives change.184 But in the long run, if the incentives are not there, 
the company can always exit the market and the agency-desired 
investment will not occur.185 
This simple example demonstrates how changing the amount 
of risk changes the amount of investment. Or as Professor Masur 
observes, “Any change in the background regulatory rules govern-
ing an industry is likely to upset the settled expectations of the 
firms and interested groups working in the affected field, leading 
to disruptions and increased costs as pre-existing programs 
become unworkable and new projects become necessary.”186 The 
inverse is also true: stability encourages investment. 
This point should not be controversial. Implicitly accounting 
for ossification’s ability to create regulatory stability, others have 
recognized that “[r]ules foster investment in productive enter-
prises by reducing the risk that regulators will deem an activity 
prohibited.”187 As Professor Mark Seidenfeld has explained, “[t]he 
greater uncertainty” there is “about whether an activity will be 
prohibited,” the more “risk costs” there are “for which investors 
[will] demand a higher rate of return. These costs, in turn, dis-
courage investment by decreasing the net present value of payoffs 
from such investment.”188 Hence, as Masur has concluded, if 
regulated parties “cannot be certain that future projects will not 
 
 183 See James C. Brau, Andrew L. Holmes, and Benjamin M. Blau, Principles of 
Finance ch 11 (MyEducator 8th ed 2017), online at http://www.myeducator.com/reader/ 
web/1380b/ (visited Sep 30, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable): 
Understanding net present value as the difference between what we will receive 
(in today’s dollars) and what we have to pay (in today’s dollars) leads us to the 
NPV decision rule. This rule states that if a project has a positive NPV we should 
accept it, and if it has a negative NPV we should reject it. 
See also id: 
Note that since we discount all the cash flows in our equation for NPV at the 
required rate of return, a positive NPV means that we earn more than our required 
return. A negative NPV means that we earn less than our required return. If NPV 
were ever exactly equal to zero, we would be earning exactly our required rate 
of return (k) and would therefore be indifferent. 
 184 See Isabelle Royer, Why Bad Projects Are So Hard to Kill, 81 Harv Bus Rev 48, 
53–55 (Feb 2003). 
 185 See id at 55–56. 
 186 Masur, 60 Vand L Rev at 1041 (cited in note 24). 
 187 Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency 
Discretion, 51 Admin L Rev 429, 434–35 (1999). 
 188 Id at 435 n 16, citing Richard Brealey and Stewart Myers, Principles of Corporate 
Finance 61–63, 112–14, 175–78 (McGraw-Hill 1981). 
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be frustrated by significant alterations in the regulatory land-
scape,” the result will be “to compel risk- and uncertainty-averse 
industries to forego potentially productive investments and lead 
to avoidable negative outcomes.”189 And by parity of reasoning, any 
effort to reduce change in the regulatory scheme will reinforce 
settled expectations, leading to fewer disruptions, and so more 
investment.190 
Relatedly, to the extent that agency commitments are credible, 
agency incentives can be smaller. The less risk associated with an 
incentive, the smaller the incentive has to be to spur the same 
level of activity. This is obviously a very simplified example, but 
imagine the following scenario: If it is 100 percent certain that 
doing some favored activity will result in a $5,000 reward, a 
certain amount of that activity will result. If it is only 50 percent 
certain, however, that doing the favored activity will be rewarded, 
the award must be $10,000 for the same amount of that favored 
activity to occur. For purposes here, this means that the stickier the 
agency’s regulations, the less the agency has to offer to generate 
the same amount of encouragement. To the extent that incentives 
are costly for agencies (and they surely are, whether the cost is 
measured in money, some other tangible resource, or in surren-
dered regulatory authority),191 this point is significant. 
C. Ossification Thus Can Expand Agency Options by Creating 
Sticky Regulations 
And now the conclusion: agencies benefit from being able to 
incentivize innovation and investment of the sort that the agency 
prefers, and a credible commitment mechanism helps agencies 
create such incentives. Ossification, which acts as a credible 
commitment mechanism, accordingly sometimes expands agency 
 
 189 Masur, 60 Vand L Rev at 1042 (cited in note 24). 
 190 See id at 1041: 
More importantly, fluid agency interpretations and re-interpretations make it 
more costly for affected entities or other stakeholders to adjust their conduct to 
conform to agency rules, and thus regulated actors may refrain from making costly 
investments or embarking upon new projects that may be endorsed under one reg-
ulatory regime but prohibited under another one that could be soon forthcoming. 
 191 Agencies are generally understood to appreciate flexibility; indeed, this idea is a 
key part of the debate over deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations. 
See, for example, Thomas Jefferson University v Shalala, 512 US 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas 
dissenting) (explaining that “vague regulations . . . maximize[ ] agency power”). When an 
agency promulgates a clear rule, it is giving up some of its discretion. 
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options because agencies backed by credible commitment mecha-
nisms are better able to encourage regulatory cooperation at a 
cheaper price. 
According to many, agencies should be free to quickly 
promulgate one rule, but then just as quickly turn around and 
promulgate another rule.192 Granted, that flexibility empowers 
agencies when it comes to regulating the present. Yet such short-
term flexibility comes at a cost: regulated parties cannot take 
agencies at their word, meaning agencies lack long-term flexibil-
ity. It is hard to say in the abstract which sort of flexibility is more 
valuable.193 But this is the trade-off. And for agencies that value 
the future more than the present, the ability to make credible 
commitments matters because agencies have more long-term 
options if regulated parties trust that agency policies are durable. 
Before investing in a capital-intensive project, regulated parties 
want certainty that the regulatory rug will not be pulled out from 
under them. And the agency may benefit if regulated parties have 
that certainty. 
Ossification can provide that certainty. Even though the APA 
does not allow the agency to contract not to change the law, the 
fact that agencies must conduct “Herculean” efforts to change a 
rule provides certainty, at least de facto.194 Indeed, one of the 
reasons why rulemaking is valuable depends on it being difficult 
to make rules. Private entities are not going to throw away money 
just because an agency wants them to; the numbers have to add 
up. Ossification thus is why the so-called Accardi principle that 
“obliges an agency to follow its own rules” provides “agencies a 
mechanism to make limited credible commitments about the 
stability of their policies.”195 If agencies could instantly change 
rules, the Accardi principle often would have little heft because 
an agency would only rarely be tempted to evade its own rules; it 
 
 192 See, for example, McGarity, 41 Duke L J at 1462 (cited in note 19). 
 193 See Note, Implementing Brand X: What Counts as a Step One Holding?, 119 Harv 
L Rev 1532, 1549 (2006): 
Advocates of greater flexibility for agencies preach on the dangers of ossifica-
tion—frozen regulatory policy unable to adapt to evolving understandings and 
circumstances. Proponents of stability emphasize the reliance parties place on 
existing laws and the tremendous costs created by destabilization. One cannot 
say a priori whether flexibility or stability is more desirable—which direction we 
ought to move toward at any given point depends on current conditions. 
 194 McGarity, 41 Duke L J at 1401 (cited in note 19). 
 195 Magill and Vermeule, 120 Yale L J at 1064 (cited in note 3), citing generally United 
States v Shaughnessy, 347 US 260 (1954) (“Accardi”). See also Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Accardi Principle, 74 Geo Wash L Rev 569, 612–17 (2006) (discussing the utility of the 
Accardi principle). 
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would simply change them.196 It is because changing rules is hard 
that the Accardi principle enables credible commitments. 
D. The Theory’s Limits 
As the foregoing demonstrates, the benefits of sticky regula-
tions are most apparent when an agency hopes to encourage 
behavior, especially behavior that requires a lot of capital and 
potentially years of activity before the investment can be recouped. 
In that sort of situation, it is intuitive that a credible commitment 
mechanism enables agencies to better regulate into the future. 
There are limits, however, to this analysis. Sometimes, an agency 
is not especially concerned about long-term incentives. Instead, it 
just wants a particular activity to stop. In that situation, the 
agency may not care much about the benefits of stickiness. (To be 
clear, even then, agency officials might appreciate it if, for 
instance, they worry that their successors will not share their 
evaluation of the danger. But that is a different sort of concern.) 
The agency is not trying to encourage private actors to do some-
thing voluntarily; it simply is telling private actors not to do some 
particular activity. Yet the same procedures (generally) apply in 
both contexts.197 Sticky regulations therefore are not always 
valuable.198 
III.  STICKY REGULATIONS: THREE EXAMPLES 
So far, the analysis in this Article has been theoretical. But 
the implications of sticky regulations are quite practical. In fact, 
looking at concrete examples, it is easy to see how ossification 
expands an agency’s ability to regulate across time. This is true 
regardless of ideology; those in essentially any ideological camp 
 
 196 Though perhaps not retroactively. See Bowen v Georgetown University Hospital, 488 
US 204, 208–09 (1988) (explaining that retroactive rulemaking is generally not allowed). 
 197 Agencies that want to stamp out some practice immediately may be better positioned 
to use the APA’s “good cause” exception, see 5 USC § 553(b)(3)(B), (d), if, for instance, the 
reason the agency wants to move quickly is because the activity is especially dangerous. 
 198 Likewise, if ossification is an overstated problem, then the threat of it may not be 
meaningful enough for the agency to gain the benefits of a credible commitment mecha-
nism. That may counsel in favor of additional procedures or some other mechanism to 
create stability. Similarly, as explained below, there may be better ways to create credible 
commitment mechanisms than through procedural requirements. For instance, it may 
make sense to allow agencies to promulgate irrevocable regulations. For purposes here, 
however, it is enough to recognize that stickiness can be valuable. Whether the current 
system creates the right amount of stickiness or does so in the right way are different, 
albeit related, questions. 
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should be able to identify regulatory policies that would benefit 
from the commitment-mechanism effects of sticky regulations.199 
A. Auto Safety 
Let’s begin with the example set forth in the opening of 
Professor Masur’s article. Although it is a hypothetical, it illus-
trates why agencies would like to be able to offer credible commit-
ment mechanisms: 
Consider the following situation: In late 2004, towards the 
end of President George W. Bush’s first term, the National 
Highway Transportation Safety Administration (“NHTSA”), 
pursuant to its congressionally delegated authority, promul-
gates a rule that would relax inspection and testing regimes 
for automobile manufacturers—thereby saving those firms 
substantial amounts of money—if the manufacturers inde-
pendently deployed cutting-edge vehicle safety technology. 
The research and development of this technology will require 
significant up-front expenditures, and automobile manufac-
turers must decide whether to invest the funds necessary to 
bring the technology to market. However, the cost-benefit 
analysis is not so straightforward. The predicament, as the 
automobile firms understand it, is that this regulatory 
regime may not last long enough to result in long-term cost 
savings. Several of the potential Democratic nominees for the 
2004 presidential campaign oppose this regulation, and, if 
President Bush were to lose the election, the incoming 
administration would possess the unilateral authority to 
discard this new rule in favor of the previous status quo (or any 
other reasonable arrangement). In light of this uncertainty, 
automobile manufacturers rationally may decide to decline 
the offer implicit in NHTSA’s new rule and not invest in the 
costly (but socially productive) new technology, frustrating 
the agency’s regulatory aims.200 
 
 199 Before addressing these examples, it is important to observe that I have not 
identified any citable evidence that regulated parties consider stickiness when making 
investment decisions; I was able to obtain confirmation on background, however, from a 
knowledgeable insider. Whether that confirmation should be dismissed as mere anecdote 
is difficult to evaluate, especially because private businesses are reluctant to share their 
internal business strategies. It is also important to recall that the entire ossification thesis 
is disputed. If the facts do not support the thesis, regulated parties would not account for 
ossification. 
 200 Masur, 60 Vand L Rev at 1022 (cited in note 24) (citation omitted). 
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Although this is just a hypothetical, it has a ring of truth to it. It 
is easy to imagine agencies trading reduced burdens on regulated 
parties in exchange for increased innovation by those parties. It 
also is easy to see why manufacturers here may be reluctant to 
take the agency at its word. 
How can the agency solve the problem? In Masur’s analysis, 
the agency is stuck—because of Brand X, regulated parties 
cannot be confident that the policy will stay in place. The agency, 
of course, could promise that nothing will change, but that 
promise would have no teeth. The agency also could promulgate 
a schedule of dates, but that would have no teeth either; the 
agency in the future could always just amend that schedule or 
rescind the rule altogether and replace it with something else. 
Thus, on Masur’s account, the agency cannot achieve what it 
wants, or at least as much of it as it wants; if an agency tries to 
induce market participants to incur the costs necessary to imple-
ment the technology, regulated parties will ignore it. 
But what if ossification can act as a commitment mechanism? 
If you were a manufacturer in this hypothetical, you would know 
that the incoming administration may want to change the policy. 
But you would also know that the new administration could not 
do so quickly or easily. Because the incentives were created by a 
rule, even a committed new administration could not instantly 
change the policy, but instead would have to go through a new 
round of rulemaking. To the extent that this is an important pol-
icy (and the fact that political candidates were talking about it on 
the campaign trail suggests that it is important), then ossification 
would hinder the new administration from undoing what the 
prior administration had just done. 
To be sure, regulated parties would not have complete confi-
dence in the agency-created incentives; it is possible that the new 
administration would, in fact, eventually change the policy, 
despite the difficulties imposed by ossification. But the odds of 
that change occurring—especially quickly—are reduced in a 
world with ossification. Thus, at the margins, regulated parties 
would have more confidence in the agency-created incentives, and 
so would be more likely to act on them. The agency in time period 
one benefits. 
B. “Clean Energy” 
The preceding example was a hypothetical. But there are real 
examples, too. Consider “clean energy.” During the Obama ad-
ministration, the White House directed agencies to encourage 
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greater use of certain types of fuels.201 Political opponents some-
times criticized such efforts.202 This political dynamic illustrates 
the power of sticky regulations; absent ossification, the amount of 
participation in “clean energy” programs presumably would be 
less because everyone would know that any incentives created 
would be subject to elimination. Indeed, now that President 
Donald Trump is in office, many of the Obama administration’s 
policies are being revisited.203 It is safe to say the policies with the 
most staying power will be those that have gone through notice-
and-comment rulemaking.204 It also seems likely that private com-
panies recognize that fact when they decide whether to invest. 
Consider, for instance, the fate of the Clean Energy Incentive 
Program (CEIP). EPA, under the Obama administration, proposed 
an ambitious incentives program “to reward early investments in 
renewable energy (RE) generation and demand-side energy effi-
ciency (EE) measures that generate carbon-free [forms of energy] 
. . . during 2020 and/or 2021.”205 In particular, the proposal, had 
it been adopted, would have “ma[d]e additional allowances or 
Emission Rate Credits (ERCs) available to states to encourage 
early reductions from zero-emitting wind or solar power projects 
and EE projects,” and further encouraged “EE projects in low 
income communities.”206 The idea was to advance the develop-
ment of new favored technologies, thus boosting “the widespread 
 
 201 See, for example, Joseph P. Tomain, The Politics of Clean Energy: Moving beyond 
the Beltway, 3 San Diego J Climate & Energy L 299, 334 (2011–2012) (explaining that “the 
Obama administration has invested political capital favoring clean energy initiatives 
through increased R&D for clean energy, a smart grid initiative and opposition to fossil 
fuel subsidies”) (citation omitted). 
 202 See, for example, Aaron Tucker, Government Intervention in Clean Energy Technology 
during the Recession, 42 Tex Envir L J 347, 348–49 (2012), citing Matthew L. Wald, 
Republicans Attack on Handling of Stimulus Money and Green Jobs (NY Times, Sept 22, 
2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/23/science/earth/23energy.html (visited 
Oct 26, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (explaining concerns that “political cronyism” 
may be at play in putative efforts to achieve clean energy, and that shifting toward solar 
power through incentive programs is “controversial”). 
 203 See, for example, Matthew Daly and Jill Colvin, Trump Signs Order Rolling Back 
Obama’s Anti–Global Warming Projects (Chi Trib, Mar 28, 2017), available at http://www 
.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-trump-climate-change-executive-order 
-20170328-story.html (visited Oct 26, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (explaining that 
Trump revoked a moratorium on coal leases and ordered the relevant agencies to begin 
rescinding the Clean Power Plan). 
 204 See Clean Air Council v Pruitt, 862 F3d 1, 9 (DC Cir 2017) (“‘[A]n agency issuing 
a legislative rule is itself bound by the rule until that rule is amended or revoked’ and ‘may 
not alter [such a rule] without notice and comment.’”), quoting National Family Planning 
and Reproductive Health Association, Inc v Sullivan, 979 F2d 227, 234 (DC Cir 1992). 
 205 Fact Sheet: Clean Energy Incentive Program (EPA, May 9, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/5LFP-MVHZ. 
 206 Id. 
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development and deployment of wind and solar, which is essential 
to longer term clean energy and climate strategies and consistent 
with the Clean Air Act’s directive to advance newer technologies.”207 
The incentive program, moreover, was designed to be optional; no 
one would have to do it.208 As of late December 2016, EPA had 
received thousands of comments regarding the CEIP.209 
The CEIP, however, was quite controversial. Indeed, it was 
related to the Obama administration’s broader Clean Power Plan, 
a rule that was stayed by the Supreme Court pending judicial re-
view and is currently before the en banc DC Circuit.210 Especially 
because of the Supreme Court’s stay, Republicans attacked the 
Obama administration for proposing a new CEIP rule.211 Likewise, 
industry groups argued that if this program is implemented, the 
incentives should extend to other competing fuels, such as 
“natural gas, nuclear, biomass and waste heat power.”212 
In other words, the situation involving the CEIP was quite 
similar to the hypothetical proposed by Masur. As there, an 
agency, at least in time period one, would like to encourage 
certain behavior, but the incentive program it has developed to do 
so is controversial to the other side of the political aisle. The 
primary difference between the situations is that the CEIP’s 
incentive program (largely) was just a proposed rule, while the 
incentive program in Masur’s hypothetical was a final rule. Like-
wise, unlike in Masur’s hypothetical, we now are in time period 
two, and regulated parties know for certain that the other political 
party in fact will determine the fate of the agency-created incen-
tives. Again, Trump, after all, won the election. One of the first 
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things that the Trump administration did was withdraw the pro-
posed CEIP rule.213 
Presumably many of those who bemoan ossification think 
that the EPA under President Barack Obama should have just 
been able to implement CEIP without having to go through a 
lengthy procedural process. Yet what would have happened in 
such a world? After the incentives were created, no one would 
trust them fully because the new administration could simply 
cancel them or change the scheme just as quickly. Put another 
way, although regulatory procedures may have prevented CEIP 
from going into effect, that does not mean that those procedures 
harmed the incentive scheme. To the contrary, the only way that 
the program could have ever worked is because those procedures 
generated stickiness. 
This point perhaps is more easily understood when one also 
considers the Department of Agriculture’s Environmental Quality 
Incentives Program, which is “a voluntary program that provides 
financial and technical assistance to agricultural producers to 
plan and implement conservation practices that improve soil, 
water, plant, animal, air and related natural resources on 
agricultural land and non-industrial private forestland.”214 This 
program was created in the 1990s and then revised through 
regulatory amendment in 2016 to include, among other things, 
efforts “to encourage development of wildlife habitat.”215 Unlike 
the CEIP, however, this revised incentives program was placed in 
a final rule.216 Now, regulated parties can more fully embrace 
those incentives because even if the Trump administration deter-
mines that they should be changed, agency officials will not be 
able to do so quickly. Regulated parties thus have more reason to 
trust the incentives and participate in the scheme.217 
 
 213 See Environmental Protection Agency, Withdrawal of Proposed Rules: Federal 
Plan Requirements for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Electric Utility Generating Units 
Constructed on or before January 8, 2014; Model Trading Rules; Amendments to 
Framework Regulations; and Clean Energy Incentive Program Design Details, 82 Fed Reg 
16144, 16144 (2017). 
 214 Environmental Quality Incentives Program (USDA), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
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 215 Department of Agriculture, Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), 
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 217 For another example, consider the fate of the Obama administration’s “methane” 
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The observation that ossification can help rather than hobble 
environmental regulation is contrary to a great deal of conven-
tional wisdom in environmental law, which seems to embrace the 
idea that “[i]f we are going to, as a society, continue and expand 
our social commitment to protecting the environment, reducing 
ossification is of the utmost importance.”218 But the conventional 
wisdom does not offer a complete analysis of the situation. True, 
ossification means that older standards remain in effect for longer 
and that some new proposals will never go into effect. Yet if 
agencies wish to create durable incentives for regulated parties to 
invest in clean energy (or anything else), ossification can be a 
valuable tool because it creates sticky regulations.219 This same 
principle holds true for Trump. If he wishes for his regulatory 
initiatives to have staying power (and so to encourage robust 
participation by regulated parties), he would be well served by 
going through the full rulemaking process. Otherwise, fewer will 
be willing to invest the capital necessary to, say, open a new coal 
facility. 
C. Internet Access 
Expanded access to the internet also has become an 
important priority in recent years. One way that the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) has sought to accomplish 
this policy goal is through a regulation to update the “Lifeline” 
program to create incentives for telecommunications providers to 
provide low-income families with subsidized internet access.220 This 
example too demonstrates the regulatory power of ossification. 
Since the mid-1980s, the Lifeline program has provided low-
income families with subsidized phone service. Although the 
program is complicated, simply stated, the way it works is that 
telecommunications companies that provide agency-favored ser-
vices to low-income consumers at reduced prices receive rewards 
from the agency. Initially, the program applied to long-distance 
telephone service. It was later expanded to mobile phones.221 
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Recently, however, the scheme was amended in a significant 
way. Specifically, in 2016, the FCC “adopted a comprehensive 
reform and modernization of the Lifeline program. In the 2016 
Lifeline Modernization Order, the Commission included broadband 
as a support service in the Lifeline program.”222 Importantly, the 
FCC did so deliberately to encourage deployment of internet re-
sources in communities that do not yet have them.223 And the FCC 
did so in a technology-forcing way: “One of the reasons behind 
adopting minimum service standards was our belief that such 
standards would ‘remove the incentive for providers to offer 
minimal, un-innovative services.’ If providers were able to collect 
support for services that did not meet our standards,” they might 
“continue to offer low-quality services.”224 
This regulatory amendment, however, was also quite contro-
versial. For instance, two out of the five FCC commissioners voted 
against it.225 As then-Commissioner Ajit Pai explained in dissent, 
although “modernizing the Lifeline program to support affordable, 
high-speed Internet access for our nation’s poorest families is a 
worthy goal,” the FCC “must be fiscally responsible and clean up 
the rampant waste, fraud, and abuse in the program so that the 
dollars we spend go to those families.”226 Importantly, Pai also was 
unhappy with the incentives because, in his view, they were not 
technology forcing enough, but instead would “consign[ ] Lifeline 
consumers to second-class broadband services for the foreseeable 
future.”227 
If you ran a telecommunications company, would you eagerly 
participate in the amended Lifeline program without ossification? 
Presumably not—all the more so now that Commissioner Pai has 
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taken the gavel as Chairman Pai.228 From the perspective of reg-
ulated parties, the sticky regulations that come from ossification 
are valuable because now they can trust—or at least trust more—
that the incentives will not disappear (which would scramble 
their investment strategies) or be substantially changed (which 
also would impact their investment strategy, especially to the 
extent that sunk costs are involved). Of course, this does not mean 
that it is certain that the Lifeline program’s incentives will 
continue; indeed, there is a fair chance that they may be modified 
(especially because the program is controversial across the 
aisle).229 But the discount factor a company uses to decide whether 
to invest in the program is lower because the current incentives 
have gone through the rulemaking process. Hence, it is reasona-
ble to think that the agency has achieved greater participation in 
the program because of regulatory stickiness. 
IV.  FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
Ossification, to the extent it is real, limits an agency’s ability 
to change the rules quickly, thus decreasing an agency’s menu of 
options in one respect. But it also enhances an agency’s ability to 
make credible commitments, thus increasing an agency’s menu of 
options in another respect. Which effect is more beneficial no 
doubt depends on the agency and program. The preceding parts 
have explained why this is so. This Part, however, addresses more 
difficult questions, including whether we want agencies to be able 
to issue sticky regulations in the first place. It also addresses 
counterarguments to the thesis that sticky regulations may help 
rather than hurt agencies. The purpose of this Part is not neces-
sarily to answer these questions but instead to identify them as 
questions. 
A. Should We Want Administrative Law to Extend across 
Time? 
By making it harder for agencies to act to change policy 
today, regulated parties know that it is more likely that the policy 
will exist tomorrow. To the extent that agencies wish to encourage 
regulated parties to go down certain paths rather than others, 
this is a good thing. Agencies are better able to direct innovation 
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because the incentives they put in effect are stable. This analysis, 
however, skips over an important question: Do we want agencies 
engaged in such long-term regulation? Although ossification in-
creases an agency’s regulatory menu (at least with regard to the 
future), it is not obvious that this is desirable. Although this 
question merits deeper thinking, here are some initial thoughts. 
To begin, as a matter of positive law, agencies can often 
regulate into the future. In fact, sometimes they are required to 
do so, for instance when Congress orders technology-forcing 
regulation. Likewise, if agencies have been delegated authority to 
regulate “in the public interest,” why can’t they use that power 
with an eye on the future?230 And if the procedures that cause 
ossification are lawful (as discussed below), then because of these 
procedures, agencies can better accomplish long-term goals. 
The harder question therefore is not one of law, but of policy. 
Should Congress empower agencies to create long-term incentives? 
The answer to this question, no doubt, depends on how confident 
we are that agencies are good at using sticky regulations. If 
agencies can use sticky regulations to create better long-term 
outcomes than would occur absent sticky regulations, then the 
argument in favor of such a power is strengthened. Alas, there is 
reason to fear that agencies are not especially good at long-term 
regulation. For instance, many have observed that agencies do 
not pick winners and losers especially well,231 presumably because 
they lack sufficient information232 or because of political pres-
sures.233 Hence, some argue that allowing agencies to participate 
in the marketplace is a recipe for waste—or potentially even 
graft—because agency officials cannot make better decisions than 
the market.234 
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At the same time, empowering agencies to regulate into the 
future creates a “dead hand” problem—policies that are not cur-
rently popular nonetheless remain on the books.235 This problem, 
of course, also applies to Congress; because it is hard to make law 
through bicameralism and presentment, it is hard to unmake law 
through bicameralism and presentment, meaning that laws that 
could not be enacted today continue to govern society.236 That 
“dead hand” dynamic may be inevitable in Congress,237 but should 
it be extended to agencies too? Or, for purposes of political ac-
countability, should we prefer a world in which agencies cannot 
go too far ahead of today’s status quo? 
To evaluate this question as a policy matter, it is necessary 
to understand what would happen in a world without ossification. 
No doubt, regulated parties would still place some trust in the 
agency’s policy; after all, if the policy is good, the next administra-
tion is likely to keep it. In any event, agencies may be encouraged 
to at least keep expectations of stability in mind.238 And even with-
out ossification, it still takes some time to change a policy. So no 
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matter what, there is at least some external restraint—some 
stickiness—on an agency’s ability to change policy. 
Even so, absent the procedures that are said to cause ossifi-
cation, the amount of reliance would decrease. How should we 
think about this? From the agency’s perspective, the net effect is 
complex, for reasons already discussed. But what about from the 
perspective of the regulated party? In one sense, if regulated 
parties were informed that agencies could change rules quickly, 
they could decide whether to participate in the market or to do 
something else. If one can choose whether to participate, where is 
the unfairness? Yet this entire analysis may be problematic. After 
all, perhaps regulated parties should have a constitutional expec-
tation that the government cannot move too quickly. There is a 
serious argument that the lawmaking process set out in Article I 
was designed to make it hard to make laws.239 So perhaps we 
should encourage ossification, and the stability it generates, under 
the theory of the “second best.”240 Whether this point is correct, of 
course, is disputed. And even if is correct, it is hard to know what 
the implications should be. These questions are far beyond the 
scope of this Article. But they are the sorts of questions that sticky 
regulations may implicate. 
The inverse of this Article’s key insight is also true. Perhaps 
the only way to prevent agencies from being able to regulate 
across time is by eliminating the procedures that are said to cause 
ossification. But those procedures are intended to protect the 
rights of the public and help prevent agency mistakes.241 If we do 
not want agencies to regulate across time, then should we eliminate 
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those procedural safeguards? This Article’s analysis, after all, cuts 
both ways. In other words, there is no silver bullet; if agencies can 
regulate easily, there is less stability and regulated parties will 
not fully trust agency-created policies. Yet if it is difficult for 
agencies to regulate, there will be more stability (which can 
benefit agencies and regulated parties), but that also means that 
agency policies may have longer shelf lives. The best approach 
may require finding the optimal amount of difficulty in light of 
those trade-offs. But how to do that? 
This is not the place for a full exploration of these questions. 
Rather, my purpose is to begin to sketch them out. Ossification 
allows agencies to better regulate across time; whether that is a 
good thing or not is a complicated question that implicates 
numerous important considerations. Going forward, the ossifica-
tion literature would be richer if scholars, apart from examining 
empirical questions about the costs and benefits of regulatory 
procedures, began considering these normative and perhaps 
sometimes even constitutional questions about the proper role of 
agencies in society’s intertemporal choices. 
B. Is Sticky Regulation Lawful? 
Another question that I have skipped over so far is whether, 
beneficial or not, the procedures that create ossification are lawful. 
Reading the APA, there is some reason to think that the modern 
rulemaking process is more rigorous than the framers of the APA 
intended.242 For instance, is the Portland Cement doctrine a correct 
application of the APA requirement that the agency shall provide 
a “[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making” that contains just “a 
description of the subjects and issues involved”?243 Arguably 
not.244 On the other hand, some of the procedures that supposedly 
cause ossification are undoubtedly lawful. For example, Congress 
required agencies to comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act.245 
And it is hard to say in a country in which “[t]he executive Power 
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shall be vested in a President”246 that the president cannot over-
see how federal agencies execute the law. Whether courts have 
misread the APA, however, is trickier. 
Ultimately, for purposes here, however, this is not a relevant 
question. The focus of this Article is ossification qua ossification, 
that is, the idea that delay may benefit agencies by better ena-
bling them to make credible commitments across time. If it is true 
that ossification has that effect, and if we conclude that such an 
effect is a good thing on balance, then whether judicially caused 
ossification is lawful is a question for another time and another 
place. Given these assumptions, if ossification were not lawful, we 
should encourage Congress to make it lawful by statute, which 
Congress undoubtedly can. 
That said, if ossification benefits agencies, that fact may have 
a legal consequence. In our system, stare decisis is real, and the 
Supreme Court has already blessed hard-look review.247 To overrule 
such a statutory decision, the Court requires a “special justifica-
tion.”248 Absent the analysis in this Article, the supposed harms 
caused by ossification may be claimed to be a special justification 
for eliminating hard-look review. To the extent, however, that 
this Article is correct, that special-justification argument should 
falter. Because it is not clear whether ossification harms or helps 
agencies on balance, any argument that hard-look review should 
be overruled faces a much steeper climb. 
C. Might Agency Officials Dislike Sticky Regulation despite Its 
Benefits? 
One possible objection to my thesis is the fact that agency of-
ficials themselves sometimes seem to bemoan procedural require-
ments that are said to cause ossification.249 If procedural delay is 
valuable because it enables agencies to make credible commit-
ments, why would agency officials dislike it? 
This is a fair objection. Even so, perhaps agency officials do 
not realize that the very “ossification” that they bemoan is, in fact, 
benefiting them. The way that the benefit works is hardly obvious, 
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so officials may not see it. Agency officials no doubt expect that 
regulations will spur desired conduct and so are not surprised 
when it happens, nor do they necessarily think deeply about why 
it happens. Yet if stickiness were to disappear, these officials may 
quickly realize just how valuable it was. 
For instance, it is safe to say that many officials during the 
Obama administration who at the time privately rued how difficult 
it was to create regulations may be singing a different tune now. 
Because of all of those procedures, the Trump administration can-
not simply flip a switch and undo what the Obama administration 
was able to accomplish through rulemaking. Thus, it is harder for 
the Trump administration to shift away from the incentives and 
other devices created by the Obama administration to encourage 
certain behaviors. This point, of course, is not ideological. If the 
Trump administration wishes its own policies (and the behaviors 
that those policies encourage) to have greater staying power, it 
too will benefit from sticky regulations. The very fact that it is 
hard to change policy means it is hard to change it back. This last 
year has demonstrated this point with clarity, in ways that per-
haps were not as obvious before now. Hence, it is possible that 
agency officials are beginning to appreciate ossification. 
Another possibility is that many agencies are primarily 
concerned with regulations for which a credible commitment 
mechanism is not especially important. The same procedures, 
however, largely apply to both types of rules. Thus, some officials 
who bemoan ossification may do so because its benefits accrue to 
officials at other agencies. And those agencies that benefit from 
stickiness may not speak up, or may not speak as loudly. 
D. Does This Mean All Procedures Are Cost Justified? 
Another concern is that even if ossification serves as a com-
mitment mechanism, and even if such a commitment mechanism 
expands the scope of what an agency can do (at least with regard 
to the future), it does not follow that all procedures are justified. 
There is a trade-off; agencies can regulate better in the future, 
but cannot regulate as well during the present. Likewise, some 
procedures may be better than others. Even if delay is good, and 
even if two procedures both produce equivalent delay, it does not 
follow that we should be indifferent about which of the procedures 
is used. In other words, even if ossification can be a valuable 
commitment mechanism, that does not mean that ossification is 
perfect, all delay is good, or all procedures always make sense. 
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On the other hand, perhaps delay sometimes should even be 
longer than what ossification today generates; for industries in 
which capital is best spent over, say, twenty-five years, the current 
amount of ossification may not be sufficient to maximize inter-
temporal credibility. Does that mean there should be more proce-
dures? It is enough for purposes here to say that if the procedural 
requirements that cause ossification were eliminated tomorrow, 
agencies would have less regulatory power than they do today, at 
least when it comes to regulating the future. Without the ability 
to promulgate sticky regulations, agencies could not induce the 
sort of long-term investment and innovation that is available in a 
world in which regulations can be sticky. How best to achieve that 
stickiness merits further reflection. 
E. Is Ossification Too Blunt an Instrument? 
Relatedly, another objection might go something like this: 
Even accepting the idea that ossification makes regulatory 
schemes stickier, thus allowing regulated parties to rely on them 
to a greater degree, it does not follow that ossification is useful 
across the board. Rather, although there may be some situations 
in which agencies are benefited by a greater ability to induce re-
liance, there may be many other situations in which agencies 
have no real interest in inducing such reliance. Yet the proce-
dures that cause ossification do apply across the board, whether 
agencies are benefited by them or not. Thus, the dilemma in 
administrative law between procedural protections and prompt 
regulatory action might still apply in a great many situations. 
It is no doubt true that there are situations in which the value 
of regulating into the future is not especially significant. Thus, to 
the extent that the procedures that cause ossification are posited 
to “push over” the cost-benefit edge by their additional benefit of 
better inducing regulatory reliance, that argument does not always 
work. Yet the important contribution of this Article is that there 
are also regulatory scenarios, and not just a few, in which ossifica-
tion and the sticky regulations it enables are a benefit to agencies. 
Identifying when agencies are benefited by credible commitment 
mechanisms should be the project of future scholarship. 
F. Is Ossification Too Expensive? 
Another possible rejoinder to sticky regulations is that even 
if we want agencies to make credible commitments, there are less 
costly ways to do so than ossification. Ossification is expensive; it 
requires massive amounts of agency and judicial resources, to say 
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nothing of the private resources necessary to pursue litigation. If 
delay is the mechanism that allows agencies to better regulate 
the future, why not just allow agencies to promulgate irrevocable 
rules—that is, rules that the agency cannot change for some set 
period of time—and save everyone a lot of time and money?250 
This objection may be valid in some respects, but it is im-
portant to recognize that it is not a response to ossification qua 
ossification. The conceptual problem with ossification is said to be 
that even though procedures are good, they are not cost justified 
because of their opportunity costs. If objections to ossification are 
not focused on those opportunity costs, then ossification qua ossi-
fication is doing no work in the analysis. If delay is on net good 
because of its commitment-mechanism potential (which bolsters 
agency-created incentives), then the question is what should be 
done during the waiting period. If procedures on the whole are 
cost justified, then the fact that they are expensive is neither here 
nor there. 
Put another way, because ossification allows agencies to 
create sticky regulations, it is incomplete to condemn ossification 
because of the opportunity costs that come with a system in which 
agencies cannot always act quickly. Even if one concludes that 
those opportunity costs outweigh the “good government” benefits 
that procedures are intended to foster, the point of this Article is 
that there are other benefits of ossification—especially an 
agency’s greater ability to regulate into the future. If that sticki-
ness benefit offsets the opportunity costs that ossification is said 
to cause, then the relevant question is whether the procedures 
that cause ossification are justified on their own terms. It is only 
if those procedures are not cost justified on their own terms—that 
is, with ossification playing no role—that we would care about 
them. Of course, if the benefit of sticky regulations only partially 
offsets ossification’s costs, the ultimate analysis becomes more 
complicated. But for purposes here, it is enough to observe that 
the situation is more complex than scholarship to date suggests. 
 
 250 See Masur, 60 Vand L Rev at 1062–63 (cited in note 24) (citation omitted): 
Consider as a thought experiment a statute that permitted agencies to select the 
option during notice-and-comment rulemaking of promulgating “permanent 
regulations,” a sub-species of typical agency regulations. An agency could iden-
tify elements of a “permanent regulation”—certain interpretations of a statute, 
particular policy choices, or decisions at any level of precision—as irreversible 
and unalterable by the agency once issued, unless struck down by a court. 
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G. What If an Agency Does Not Want Stickiness? 
Finally, what if an agency does not want stickiness? Or, more 
realistically, what if an agency wants less stickiness than ossifi-
cation currently creates? This is a problem. If agencies believe 
that they will not be able to easily change the regulation, they 
may be more reluctant to promulgate it at all. This may encourage 
agencies to regulate through other procedural devices (despite the 
public benefits of rulemaking, such as greater public participa-
tion)251 or to do nothing. One possible solution to this is for the 
agency to promulgate regulations with sunset provisions. This is 
not a perfect solution because ossification (to the extent the thesis 
is true) makes it difficult for the agency to act quickly, though, 
perhaps, there would be less opposition to a lower-stakes regula-
tion. In any event, at least it is one tool an agency has to prevent 
locking itself in.252 Perhaps other tools can be developed as well.253 
CONCLUSION 
In a perfect world, there would be no opportunity costs. But we 
live in a world of dilemmas. Many say that administrative law is 
an example of this. Rulemaking procedures are good in that they 
help encourage participation and prevent mistakes. But they come 
at a cost; they delay regulatory action, and prompt regulatory ac-
tion can itself be a good thing. Thus, the story goes, it is necessary 
to strike the right balance between procedural protections and 
agency promptness. And within this framework, a great many 
administrative-law scholars contend that the balance should be 
tilted more heavily in favor of agencies because the good that pro-
cedures enable is outweighed by the good that they foreclose. 
Some dilemmas, however, are false—or at least are different 
than commonly understood. There is reason to think that this 
supposed dilemma within administrative law is one of these. The 
very delay and difficulty that is so lamented might, in fact, some-
times benefit agencies by allowing them to better regulate into 
the future. If agencies could immediately change the rules, regu-
lated parties would be much less willing to accept what agencies 
say. And for that reason, regulated parties would be much less 
 
 251 See Nielson, 105 Georgetown L J at 988 (cited in note 19). 
 252 See Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 Berkeley Tech L J 175, 
182 (2014) (“Agencies can experiment with binding regulation. For example, agencies 
might use regulatory sunsets to better calibrate how long the intervention endures.”). The 
pros and cons of sunset provisions are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 253 Another possible solution is to decrease the value of the offered incentive; the stick-
iness generated by procedures will be the same, but there will be less participation. 
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willing to trust incentives. To the extent that uncertainty discour-
ages the sort of innovation that the agency prefers, it narrows an 
agency’s long-term options. So to the extent that ossification 
reduces uncertainty, it expands an agency’s options. Of course, 
that expansion comes at a price; it is harder for the agency to 
immediately pivot. The total change in the agency’s long-run 
options—the trade-off between short-run and long-run flexibility—
depends on the specific scheme. But the point here is that there 
are two effects of ossification: one involving the present and an-
other involving the future. 
The implications of this realization are potentially far reaching. 
The ossification literature is largely premised on the idea that 
delay is bad for agencies. On that understanding, reform makes 
much more sense. But this Article shows that delay—an essential 
ingredient of sticky regulations—sometimes can be good for agen-
cies. The ossification literature therefore is too simplistic. It is not 
true that ossification presents a straightforward dilemma between 
procedural protections and agency flexibility. Instead, making it 
easier for agencies to act today might make it harder for them to 
achieve a goal that can only be realized tomorrow. The right ques-
tion, therefore, is not “how can we speed up agency action,” but 
rather “what is the right amount of agency delay?” Answering 
that more nuanced question should be the future of the ossifica-
tion literature. 
But for here at least, the point is simple: ossification has an 
upside, and sticky regulations are far too important to be over-
looked any longer. 
